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I. INTRODUCTION
 
y concern is with maps. Maps, that is, in general and in particular 
with their physical manifestation, with ink on paper. It is my inten-
tion to come to a broad, workable understanding of the nature of maps, 
mapping and cartography. Not perhaps anything so grand as a theory but 
instead a convention, usable and useful in daily practice. 
Maps, in our society, are ubiquitous; they enter into our lives and affect 
us all in ways and on occasions that are obvious and hidden, overt and 
subtle. We all recognize maps when we see them, and in fact we recognize 
such a range and variety of things as maps as to render a comprehensive 
definition based on typologies or outward appearances problematic. For 
many people maps are objects of delight and wonder, and for others they 
are a terror. In any case, maps are but vaguely understood by the great 
majority of the populace, even by those people who make almost constant 
use of them. This is in part traceable to the manner in which map literacy, 
if it is taught at all, is limited and rudimentary. As Mark Monmonier 
(1977) wrote, “almost all people in developed countries are consumers of 
maps, but they receive little formal training in map reading” (from pref-
ace).  Obviously, too, this situation is not new; Thomas Blundeville (1589) 
wrote that “I daylie see many that delight to looke on Mappes […] but 
yet for want of skill in Geography, they knowe not with what manner of 
lines they are traced, nor what those lines do signify nor yet the true use of 
Mappes” (from “To the Reader”). 
Some parallel can be found in the words of Ezra Pound (1960, in a 
treatise on metre): “fortunately or unfortunately, people CAN write 
stuff that passes for poetry, before they have studied music” (p 197). 
This same lack can be discovered, perhaps surprisingly, in more than 
a few mapmakers. John Belbin (1996 p 253), formerly of the College of 
Geographic Sciences in Nova Scotia, has observed that there seem to be 
two groups of people involved with cartography, groups which I will 
call the academicians and the workers, with most of the activity of the 
former little touching the toils of the latter. Much of my own professional 
activity as a cartographer is carried out as guide and resource to a pool 
of worker types, people for whom mapmaking is little more than a job of 
pleasing their customers; clients who themselves in turn have very little 
notion of what should be expected from the maps they commission. The 
map literacy of most people is of a very low order and even many mak-
ers of maps seem to be unaware that there is a language and vocabulary, 
highly developed and of long standing, associated with construction 
of map texts. Much is required of maps, much from the makers of the 
maps, and much from the map users. 
What I am attempting is to come to an understanding or convention 
which will allow and promote the production of high quality map prod-
ucts, and in that way both raise the expectations of the users and make it 
easier for map making technicians to produce good maps than otherwise. 
In keeping with Samuel Johnson’s (1765) dictum that “part [of any skill] 
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is infused by precept, and part is obtained by habit” (p 351), my aim is to 
provide a precept to guide the habit of the map maker. In this attempt to 
define the activity in practical terms, terms understandable and accept-
able in a working environment not much impressed with theory, I have to 
begin with basics.
Maps are constructed in order to carry meaning, that is, to carry or 
convey some sort of information to some one. The map is not the mapped 
thing itself, not the territory, but instead it stands for that thing in some 
limited way (but not in all respects) for some person. Maps are signs and 
collections of signs, laying out in graphical form indications of spatial 
relationships or placing into spatial context other information with a 
locational attribute. They often employ representational devices (which 
may or may not be depictive), yet maps remain only a signification of the 
feature, configuration, relationship, or context. The strong identification 
with the thing signified may lead to confusion in the mind of the observer, 
a confusion similar to that which Jean-Paul Sartre (1962) calls “the naïve 
metaphysics of the image” (p 4). One is reminded of René Magritte’s 1926 
painting Ceci n’est pas une pipe, (This is not a pipe), where, although the 
imagery references enough aspects of pipe-ness, that in looking at it one’s 
initial reaction is to recognize the image as a pipe, one cannot ultimately 
confute the validity of the inscription. Indeed, it is not a pipe, no more 
than Whistler’s (1871) Arrangement in Grey and Black is Whistler’s Mother, 
or a map of New York is New York. A map of the earth is not the earth, nor 
(incidentally) is it a homologue of the earth. A map of the earth is a sign 
for the earth; that is, it stands for the earth in some particular respects (but, 
again, and critically, not in all respects) to someone (and not necessarily to 
just anyone). In other words the map is a visual text, which can be read by 
those literate in that visual language. 
It is important not to become alarmed at this use of the term text. A text 
is, in this context, any form in which a message can be devised. Sometimes 
we encounter literary texts, sometimes bodily, musical, visual, or other 
texts, and while each type is quite distinct and unique, each is in its nature 
and operation a message charged with some sort of meaning which must 
be read or in some manner interpreted for that meaning to be revealed.
As has been mentioned, the definition of what can be called a map is 
extremely broad. Individual maps can be as simple as a sketch of the route 
to the druggist’s, as gaudy as a geological map, or as dense as a National 
Geographic insert, but nonetheless each one can be identified, used, and 
accepted as a map by users who can identify, use, and accept it as such. 
Arguably, maps are the most complex of graphic products and their func-
tion too is very complex. A map exists operationally on a variety of levels, 
both independently and interdependently, and these levels determine and 
control our attitude towards, and our understanding and use of, the map. 
The operational levels range from the immediate and physical to other 
levels more subtle and discrete. 
Perhaps the most immediate level, that experienced from the first 
moment of encounter and thereafter, is the physical embodiment of the 
map as an object. This is an aspect I identify as a sculptural concern: the 
relationship of this object to my body. Its size, shape, and material, the 
way it folds or rolls and if I hold it in my hands or place it on a table or 
hang it on a wall all plays a part in this experience. It is about what the 
object is, and the way in which I encounter and interact with it. There are 
also mechanistic aspects of paper, ink, printing, and packaging which 
enter our consideration. A book or map badly printed is unreadable and 
less than it might otherwise be, and although the printer’s craft itself is 
not within the purview of my project, such details of process and materi-
“Maps are constructed in order 
to carry meaning, that is, to 
carry or convey some sort of 
information to some one.”
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als use are not unimportant factors in consideration of any individual 
example.
The graphic complexity of the map has already been touched upon, 
and the existence of the map as graphic is another operational level. 
One source of the complexity here is the relationship between figura-
tion and image, and the density of marks on the surface. Another is a 
function of the hierarchy of information, and the complex manner in 
which the different sets of data interact, compete, and separate on the 
page. There can be several very different types of thematic and contex-
tual data displayed simultaneously, and the display of what is shown is 
governed by the symbolization and generalization employed, as well as 
by other factors. 
Typographic text work can make or break a map, and it is one of the 
most difficult and often mishandled graphic aspects of the map. Usually 
there is both lettering on the map face itself and blocks of contextual or 
supporting text, and each must be handled competently if the map is to 
work as well as it can.
There should be a concern with the veracity of the data on a map. That state-
ment is deceptively simple, but, like one of Humpty Dumpty’s port-
manteaus, there are two meanings here packed into one. On one level it 
refers to what I will call measurable truth: can one or can one not drive 
from Brunswick Street to Lower Water Street down George Street? On 
another level is the question put by Pontius Pilate: what is truth? 
Maps are accepted as truthful presentations of ‘reality’ very readily; 
much more readily than, say, writing or speech,  but the justification for 
this touching faith is a bit thin. When confronted with a map it is im-
perative for the reader to ask: where did this data come from? why was 
it generated in the first place? who chose to place it on this map? why in 
this way? why has it been shown at all? and conversely, what has been 
left out? Since any map can, at best, present only a version of a distor-
tion of the truth (much like history, which, as Napoleon is said to have 
remarked, is simply a lie agreed upon), it is one task in map making to 
determine just what truth will be preserved; whose truth will be pre-
served; what can usefully or innocuously be distorted; in what manner; 
and what inconvenient or irrelevant data will be left out. The reader is 
presented, of course, with the converse conundrum, and s/he must in 
some manner decon-struct the map to try to interpret it. All maps are 
editorial, that is, they are rhetorical; they place before the reader a(n) 
(persuasive) argument. The mapmaker is trying to induce the reader to 
take the map on faith, to believe in the completeness of the information, 
the disinterested selection and presentation, the truth and reliability of 
the map. While this attempt is most often recognized in advertising or in 
political maps (usually in studies of an enemy’s propaganda maps) it is 
an inherent aspect of all maps. 
Finally then, I would mention the vehicle for delivery of all this; the 
means by which the text of the map is presented for examination and the 
way that ‘all available arguments’ are marshaled is in a context that is, or 
should be, familiar: it is the language of visual art.  These are just a few 
of the levels on which an individual map can function and just a few of 
the questions and concerns which attend any map. There are more, and 
of course the few I have mentioned can be elaborated. 
What ties these levels of operation together is that any particular map 
makes use of these operative levels to convey ideas with reference to an 
audience. In other words, a map seeks in some manner to convince some-
one of something. Significantly, the conveyance of ideas with reference to 
an audience is how Francis Bacon defines rhetoric. While it is not unusual 
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for a rhetorical aspect to be recognized in mapmaking, I am proposing that 
rhetoric is the central and defining aspect of the map. Recognizing the cen-
trality of rhetoric, that is, of the persuasive impetus, to the map allows us 
to view cartography as an activity without specific subject matter: there is 
no ‘definitive map’ but instead one or more ‘appropriate maps’ for a given 
situation. Rhetoric, understood in this manner is not ‘the dress of thought’ 
in the sense of ‘the fancy dress’ but rather the ‘embodiment of thought’, or 
‘the word made flesh’. 
I propose to show how the operational levels referred to above function 
in support of the map as a rhetorical entity, and how the rhetoric of the 
map is realized through the operation of the map on the various levels. 
Taking the topic as a whole, I have categorized the concerns attendant to 
the operative levels into three main registers of approach: the cognitive, the 
semiotic, and the artistic. These registers are of course somewhat artificial 
and overlapping, and are adopted primarily for convenience of discus-
sion, but they have utility. It should be noted that I am not dividing the 
subject bilaterally, as has often been done previously, into oppositions such 
as ‘cognitive vs. perceptual’ or ‘science vs. art’. The individual registers 
are instead conceived as useful vantages for viewing the same undivided 
subject, each viewpoint valid in itself but incapable by itself of providing 
a complete picture. As Durrell’s (1968) Ludwig Pursewarden notes: “two 
paces west and the whole picture is changed.”
The register I identify as the cognitive encompasses the physical and 
perceptual aspects of the experience of the map: what one sees, how one 
sees it, the totality of the experience of how the object or artifact appears 
on the paper.  The semiotic register is essentially the manner in which we 
make sense of what we perceive. How the signs acquire meaning both in-
dividually and as parts of a wider and more complex whole, and issues of 
control and direction of interpretation of the understandings engendered 
are engaged here. Why who is saying what to whom, and how, and how is 
what being said by whom to who?  The artistic register works as the material 
vehicle for the exchange; it is the means of leaping from the image to the 
territory. It provides the mechanism for the organized blots and scratch-
ings to blossom as items of significance.
These registers are analogous to those aspects of meaningfully charged 
language identified by Pound (1960) as phanopoeia, melopoeia, and 
logopoeia, that is, how the poem appears upon the page (phanopoeia), how 
it is presented to the ear (melopoeia), and how it is revealed to the mind 
(logopoeia). In his ABC of Reading, Pound (1960) states:
Language is a means of communication. To charge language with 
meaning to the utmost degree, we have, as stated, the three chief 
means:
I throwing the object (fixed or moving) on to the visual imagina-
tion.
II inducing emotional correlations by the sound and rhythm of the 
speech.
III inducing both of the effects by stimulating the associations 
(intellectual or emotional) that have remained in the receiver’s 
consciousness in relation to the actual words or word groups em-
ployed. 
 (p 63)
 
I would like to propose the equation of phanopoeia with the cognitive, 
logopoeia with the semiotic, and melopoeia with the artistic registers. The 
“Rhetoric, understood in this 
manner is not ‘the dress of 
thought’ in the sense of ‘the 
fancy dress’ but rather the 
‘embodiment of thought’, or 
‘the word made flesh’.”
“. . . “two paces west and the 
whole picture is changed.””
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‘charging with meaning to the utmost degree’ is the task of cartographic 
practice in a graphic environment in the same manner as Pound identifies 
the task of literature in language. I am not making hard and fast correla-
tions here, but am instead trying to draw an analogy that may be useful in 
understanding the interrelationship of the registers. An alternative anal-
ogy would be to link the cognitive, semiotic, and artistic registers with the 
divisions of semiotic identified by Charles W. Morris (1982): syntactics, 
semantics, and pragmatics (respectively). The first concerns the relations 
of signs amongst themselves, the second deals with how signs carry mean-
ing, while the third studies the origins, uses and effects of signs. Again, 
at this stage these analogous identifications are only offered as figures of 
metonymy or metaphor and may or may not be useful to the individual 
reader.
The operative levels, categorized in the identified registers, underpin 
the rhetorical nature of the map because it is through the registers that 
the rhetorical position of the map is put forward. The rhetorical position 
remains the central impetus for the map’s existence, and so governs the 
operative implementations. The conception of the map as a rhetorical text 
ties the map together and makes of it a persuasive argument utilizing all 
possible means of convincing the user audience of its core thesis or theses.
Employment of a rhetorical model for cartography also allows access to 
the vocabulary of classical rhetoric for framing our discussion. Using this 
vocabulary we can examine and discuss cartography itself as opposed to 
examining individual maps. Three terms in particular are essential to the 
rhetorical model: Logos, Pathos, and Ethos. These are the primary appeals 
that a speaker (in this instance, a map) makes to an audience; the appeal 
to logic (logos), the appeal to the emotions (pathos), and the ethical or 
authoritative appeal (ethos). They each in turn govern, respectively, the 
usefulness, usability, and desirability of the map.
In dealing with such a complex subject it is perhaps good at the outset 
to consider just what sort of answer is to be sought by such an exploration. 
In undertaking this work I am keeping in mind what David Marr (1982) 
wrote concerning complex systems:
[we must] be prepared to contemplate different kinds of explanation at 
different levels of description that are linked, at least in principle, into a 
cohesive whole, even if linking the levels in complete detail is impracti-
cal. (p 25)
The end sought here is the establishment of that cohesive convention of 
understanding; a persuasive argument of the rhetorical nature of cartogra-
phy.
II. THE COGNITIVE REGISTER
 
This section will look at some aspects of the cognitive register: that is, with 
how one perceives and cognizes that which is placed before one on the 
paper, cathode ray tube, or whatever the case may be. I can only hope to 
touch upon a few aspects of this, so I will concentrate on the basics of em-
pirical understanding: how one judges what is essential. I want to identify 
some basic ‘rules of thumb’, not as a recipe or prescription but instead as 
core principles establishing a ‘toolkit’ for ‘good practice’.
The somewhat unfashionable tenets of Gestalt psychology are pro-
posed here as a framework for understanding the working of perception 
and of cognition, and a brief discussion of the work of Marr (1982) in 
artificial vision will be used to support these tenets. Next, I will con-
“Three terms in particular are 
essential to the rhetorical model: 
Logos, Pathos, and Ethos.”
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sider the dichotomy of looking and of seeing, and the importance, in the 
cartographic context, of each to the composition of the map. This section 
will conclude with identification of the basic elements of a vocabulary of 
graphic symbols and a consideration of a grammar for that vocabulary 
and for text placement.
This cognitive side of the business is one that has received a great deal 
of attention in North American cartographic circles. That this should 
be so is not too surprising because, after all, it may, at first blush and 
without much reflection, seem pointedly self-evident that an ‘improve-
ment in mapping’ would centre upon, well, ‘improving’ the map; that 
is, somehow improving the thing in one’s hand. Early post-world war II 
formulations of communication theory, notably Shannon and Weaver’s 
(1949) Mathematical Theory of Communication, would seem in fact point 
to precisely the carrier of the message (in this instance, the map) as be-
ing not only the crux but indeed the sum of the problem. The effect of 
Shannon and Weaver, and of various other communication theories on 
cartographic thinking will be dealt with in a later section, but suffice it 
to say that the clear value of the investigations, backed by a sometimes 
almost evangelical theoretical orthodoxy, has somewhat exaggerated 
the position of these concerns in cartographic thinking and practice. 
While it seems clear that while much that is of fundamental significance 
to understanding how to compose cartographic products of clarity and 
legibility has, and can yet be, learned, such study is not the whole of the 
biscuit. When Allen MacEachren (1995) writes that: 
research that makes maps used by air traffic controllers or pilots less 
prone to misinterpretation would probably be valued by anyone who 
travels by air, perhaps even a postmodernist. (p 11) 
 
there is an implicit assertion that avoiding misinterpretation (or Italian 
ski lifts) is largely a function of cognitive study. Although these aspects 
certainly deserve scrutiny, it is not clear that such results are deliverable 
by these means alone.  There has been, and continues to be, a broad field 
of cognitive, perceptual cartographic concerns open for investigation. De-
tails, and in many instances fundamental details, still await investigation 
and it is to be expected that important discoveries will yet be made. 
The cartographic literature abounds with perceptual studies. There 
seems to be no shortage of diligent investigators busily pining down 
quantitative evaluations of what it is that is actually going on when one 
gazes, or even glances, at a map. Unfortunately, the bulk of this great 
body of documentation is rather stiff slogging, and in fact relatively little 
will ever be used in a production environment. How then do we proceed 
in our search for an understanding utilizable in that selfsame production 
situation? I would submit that we should look for tools or conventions 
directly applicable to the practical, production decisions encountered 
in day-to-day practice. A vocabulary of map symbols and text usage, 
and a grammar for implementation would allow us not only to guide 
and inform composition decision-making but it would as well provide a 
convention in the light of which to evaluate any new determination from 
research.
A. Gestalt
The main elements for understanding effective construction of maps that 
communicate exist today in broad empirical form. It is clear that effective 
implementations of the understandings put forward by Gestalt psychol-
“. . . there is an implicit
assertion that avoiding
misinterpretation (or Italian
ski lifts) is largely a function
of cognitive study.”
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ogy are central to the undertaking. Much recent cognitive map study 
seems to support or to build upon and extend the constructs posited by 
the Gestaltists, even where their laws are not explicitly referred to by the 
investigators. Although psychology and linguistics have each moved 
beyond, or perhaps diverged from Gestalt theory, the utility of the basic 
gestalt principles to cartographic design remains evident. As a basis for a 
conventional understanding these ‘rules’ provide an ‘everyday’ or ‘work-
able’ grounding in an easily grasped and applicable form. We should look 
to these ‘laws’ as a linking viewpoint in evaluating individual ‘discover-
ies’ or ‘prescriptions’. 
It is notable that the German term Gestaltpsychologie is often translated 
as ‘psychology of form’, because of the direct concern of the Gestaltists 
with particular, concrete phenomena. These principles or ‘Laws of Orga-
nization in Perceptual Forms’, include the factors of Proximity, Similarity, 
Figural Stability, Good Continuation, Closure, Common Fate, and Experi-
ence or Habit, as well as the factor of Objective Set that is of significance 
in dynamic situations. The dominant gestalt qualities of simplicity, sym-
metry, balance, and “closed-ness” (the state of being closed) form a field, 
which is at the same time both the product and the stage of the interac-
tions. The theory has it that 
the visual system converges on the most regular and systematic per-
ception consistent with the sensory information. (Rock and Palmer, 
1990, p 88) 
 
Or perhaps more clearly, that:
a Gestalt is not an array of self-contained elements, but a configuration 
of forces interacting in a field. (Arnheim, 1986, p 267) 
 
In the same way that a sequence of notes can posses attributes of har-
mony and rhythm not to be identified in any one of the notes, we see that 
a whole has properties that do not reside in the individual parts. Integral 
with this unified effect is the fundamental duality of the relation of figure 
and ground. The qualities of the ground affect the qualities of the figure 
quite directly. This is perhaps most evident in relation to color. There, for 
example, the color of a background brings about a complementary shift in 
the color of the figure and can even play a part in the identification of the 
constituent elements’ place in the figure - ground dichotomy.  This may all 
seem rather obvious, but recall that at this point we are establishing first 
principals.
B. Vision
It is not unusual for writings about cartographic perception to begin with 
a discussion of the eye. The construction and substructure of the human 
eye has been examined in various levels of detail in an attempt to describe 
the function of vision as a function of the operation of the eye. This might 
seem to be a good starting point for developing an understanding: it is 
with and through the eye that vision is affected. The limits of the eye’s 
response places solid limits upon vision: for example, only some wave-
lengths of electromagnetic radiation are visible. The variations in wave-
lengths that are discernable as different, the size of features identifiable, 
and so forth, all are in the end definitively restricted to what can be regis-
tered using that organ. The eye is the tool of vision, but one must be wary 
of analyses of processes that extrapolate from an examination of the tool. It 
“. . . a Gestalt is not an array of 
self-contained elements, but a 
configuration of forces
interacting in a field.
(Arnheim, 1986, p 267)”
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Marr and Gestalt
According to Marr’s model, we begin by 
processing the retinal image, the undiffer-
entiated pattern, into a primal sketch: we 
identify edges, blobs, and as well identify 
apparent major and detail structures. This 
primal sketch is refined into what he calls 
the 2½D sketch by extrapolation of, among 
other things, ‘hints’ at a three dimensional 
organization. The centering of this cogni-
tive picture remains on the viewer (one is 
still in the midst of a pattern to be under-
stood) and is entirely precognitive, except 
insofar as already processed imagery, from 
moments or longer ago, can, for instance, 
provide direction for attention. Only then 
can the 3D model representation, an object 
centered depiction of the organization of 
the space in view, be achieved. It is in the 
3D representation that we can actively func-
tion. Once the processing is at this stage, 
we have left the centre of the kaleidoscope 
image.
It seems apparent that what we are distin-
guishing early on in vision are the very dif-
ferences which produce gestalt groupings 
and figures. If there is no contrast, no fig-
ures emerge from the ground; if the objects 
are indistinguishable among themselves, no 
groups coalesce from the mass. Certainly, 
we can ‘learn’ to see things certain ways 
(top - down processing of information). We 
can even ‘flip’ optical illusionary spaces 
at will. Apparently, though, we initially 
‘bootstrap’ the visual scene into order by 
organizing what we actually find before us. 
This is significant when we are aiming for 
clear, concise, and immediate understand-
ing of our graphic.
is, for instance, conceivable to conclude the existence of a screw from a slot 
screwdriver, but it is equally consistent with much of the evidence to hy-
pothesize a paint can or block of ice. Wittgenstein’s (perhaps apocryphal) 
question of ‘what would the world look like if it looked round?’ certainly 
comes to mind. Marr (1982) warns us about the pitfalls of trying to come 
to an understanding of flight from a study of the feather; it is “aerodynam-
ics [that] provides the context in which to understand feathers” (p 336). 
There are many properties of feathers which contribute significantly to 
flight, but:
almost never can a complex system of any kind be understood as
a simple extrapolation from the properties of its elementary
components […]”  
(Marr, 1982, p 10)
 
Flight is possible without feathers (bees and bats manage it), and pos-
session of feathers is not a ticket to flight (kiwis, dodos, etc., etc.). One 
must begin an understanding of such a system (of vision or of flight) by 
consideration of why the task is undertaken and only after that can one 
sort out problems of implementation. This approach fits well with the 
experience of anyone who has set out to assemble a computer program: 
one must begin with a thorough understanding of the task requirements, 
including the whole range of demands likely to be placed upon the sys-
tem. Neglecting this runs the risk of being trapped by shortcomings of the 
implementation mechanisms into allowing them to determine the param-
eters of functionality. We see as we do because sight developed to help 
us survive, and not because we had to make the best of the eyes we were 
given. It can be seen then that investigating the structure and mechanics 
of the eye itself, as fascinating as it might be, is not a particularly useful 
exercise for our purposes. We might take a look, however, at the mechan-
ics of eye’s function; that is at vision.
Marr (1982) posits that vision is an informational processing exercise, 
the process of making usable sense of the profusion of flecks and blobs 
impinging upon our eyes. We are “building a description of the shapes 
and positions of things from images” (p 123), which we do in a modular-
ized process that allows decisions to be made. For instance, in comparing 
features we reach a stage in the processing where ‘enough’ has been ‘seen’ 
after which further detail resolution or evaluation is unnecessary. 
The modularity of processing suggested by Marr has interesting impli-
cations for the interpretation of map symbols. For example, when we are 
visually scanning a National Park Service map looking for a camping site, 
this modular processing may allow us to sort out the set of winter sports 
symbols from the set of camping symbols before specific recognition of 
any symbol takes place. To locate a campsite symbol, we do not have to 
understand that a particular symbol means ‘ski-bobbing’ to rule it out as a 
candidate for closer examination. (MacEachren, 1995, p 31-2) 
 Although the mechanics of implementation in Marr’s theory are rather 
more complex than the straightforward situation implied by the laws of 
Good Figure, it would seem that the groupings Marr finds formed in early 
vision are essentially Gestalt groups. That we are organizing our percep-
tions along the lines of these groups should play a significant role in our 
construction of the map graphic. 
In my discussion of vision and perception as related to cartographic 
concerns I rely a good deal upon the theory of vision as an information 
processing activity as laid out by Marr, not so much because of a great 
faith in the ultimate truth of his work but rather because of its great utility. 
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A theory that accounts reasonably for the observed phenomena without 
undue internal strain or logical fallacy, while adhering to the principal of 
simplicity (Occam’s Razor), can, I think, reasonably be taken as a work-
ing truth.  The Gestalt association can also be made with the writings of 
Jacques Bertin (1983), the French author of Semiology of Graphics, in regard 
to the distinction between image and figuration, and as well to his work 
with graphic variables. 
C. Image and Figuration
In viewing and using maps one encounters a dichotomy in the opposition 
of looking and reading. When we read a page of text filled with unfamiliar 
words, or in an awkward or tortured syntax (or an unfamiliar language 
altogether), we must gaze at and ‘read’ each individual mark. Each letter 
may be significant and must be attended to, along with its association with 
its neighbors. Usually, however, we do not read a language with which we 
are familiar in this way. In such cases we are looking at the words as iden-
tifiable patterns; our eye skipping along, hitting here and there, recogniz-
ing words from their shape. We anticipate what will be found next from 
context and experience, and can be fooled without too much difficulty by 
tricks like 
‘Paris in the 
the Spring’.
 
The distinction between reading and looking is a significant one. Read-
ing, for instance, requires a detailed visual inspection, an engagement on 
the most basic level of the individual markings as well as a wider appreci-
ation of the interrelationships between the individual mark and its neigh-
bors in the vicinity. It is, in fact, a semantic activity. Bertin (1983) writes 
that a graphic constructed to carry its message this way relies on its figu-
ration. This refers to the interrelationship between individual elements, 
each functioning as a sign, or as a part of a larger sign, and can practically 
only reach a ceiling density before merging into an undifferentiable mass. 
Bertin (1983) dictates a density of about ten signs per square centimeter 
as maximum, although he states that this value can vary considerably 
due to a number of factors including “the number of different images, the 
utilization of differences in implantation, the retinal variables employed, 
and the reading habits of the individual” (p 176).  Much information can 
be encoded in this manner, and much can be gleaned from the study of 
such a graphic, but it can mean a lot of work on the part of the map reader. 
Very often, this reader would simply not bother and would instead seek 
the information in some other place; a supporting text for instance. The 
danger of misreading increases too, along with the demand for complex 
interpretation.  
In contrast to figuration is the structuring of information as an image. 
Bertin (1983) uses “the term IMAGE to describe the meaningful form 
immediately perceptible in the minimum instant of vision” (p 151).  He 
writes that
 
an image remains legible while accommodating great graphic densities 
and thus substantial photographic reductions. Consequently, reading 
on the intermediate and overall levels is generally found to be easier. (p 
176)
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Figure 1. The general solution for any geographic problem involving more 
than two components is a collection of images, each one comprehensive. 
From Economic Censuses in Spain, Jacques Bertin, Semiology of Graph-
ics, (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1983), p 398.
This ease is ascribable to the manner of decipherment, to a looking over 
a reading, in the sense discussed above. Bertin himself makes excellent 
use of the image in his graphic multiples. As Wood (1985) wrote “No one 
has ever dared to shrink graphics as small as Bertin does” (p 120) (figure 
1), and this is a function of Bertin’s processing of information to create 
images which, although they sacrifice ‘elemental precision’ allow mean-
ingful evaluations and comparisons. With an image the user retrieves the 
information and recognizes the relationships at a glance. This looking is 
far more efficacious than a laborious reading in achieving an end.
 
With an IMAGE, we can choose to isolate either […] elementary im-
ages, or […] intermediate images, or reduce the information to a single 
overall image. Information constructed as an image accommodates all 
levels of reading. (Bertin, 1983, p 151)
 
In the overall image the character of the data can be presented while 
still allowing access to the detail that supports and further defines the 
information presented, but never allowing the detail to clutter or obscure 
the unified pattern. The source of the information is of course at the el-
ementary level, but it is the patterns and relationships that emerge when 
we can see the broader configurations at intermediate or overall levels that 
may be of the greatest significance. If we simply require an inventory, then 
often (but not always) a list or table will serve better than a map. It is that 
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ability to climb between the different levels of reading that constitutes one 
of the unique powers of, and justifications for, a map.
Make no mistake, I am not advocating subsuming precision to the 
dictates of a pretty picture. I am highlighting the imperative importance of 
the independence of the various levels of information that may be present-
ed. For many people the concentration of detail, even of extraneous detail, 
is the hallmark of ‘accuracy’. Charles W. Chapman (1958), in Piloting, 
Seamanship and Small Boat Handling advises;
In using a chart in which soundings are few, indicating the lack of a 
thorough survey, the area should be navigated with caution […] (p 328b) 
(my italics) 
 
reflecting the practice until recently of crowding a navigational chart sur-
face with numerals, primarily to give the user an illusion of the great pains 
with which the survey was made. One effect of this practice was to render 
visualization of the underwater topography a tedious and sometimes 
chancy operation: how easy it is to miss that one sounding shallower than 
your draft in the field of otherwise safe depths. Bertin (1983) noted that 
situations like this could easily arise, and felt that it could and should be 
avoided: 
Numerous studies show that the average person tends to read on the 
elementary level and encounter difficulties in adopting the intermedi-
ate level and, even more, the overall level. Graphic designers contrib-
ute to this habit by continuing to provide the public with figurations 
(haphazard curves, encyclopedic cartography, visual ‘puzzles’). These 
encourage the reader to remain on the elementary level. However, 
as constructions in a single image multiply, and as designers realize 
to what extent figurations are inefficient or anecdotal, the reader will 
learn to utilize better the perceptual means with which we are en-
dowed. (p 153)
It is worth noting that the trend in navigational charting is towards dis-
playing a much sparser field of soundings, concentrating on those deemed 
significant and supplementing them by submarine contours. This practice 
constructs the map as an image while preserving the accuracy of the data. 
The illusion of accuracy fostered by the field of spot depths is replaced by 
the illusion of accuracy implied by continuous depth contours. The latter 
method, as an image of the situation, is easier to visualize. The acces-
sibility to use, afforded by construction as an image, is coupled with the 
affordance of a clearer field left for plotting courses and bearings, no small 
advantage in such a product. 
There remain nonetheless many situations where construction of a figu-
ration is desirable or even required. Reasons for this could range from the 
need to incorporate multiple thematic variables, to the plain and simple 
need to present the very detailed information that would be generalized 
out in the construction of an image. The image’s advantages of interplay 
between registers or levels of information should not be neglected even 
in these cases; in some instances both multi-variate figurations and single 
variate images (multiple maps) can be constructed, while in other situa-
tions careful selection of symbols and presentation can preserve both the 
higher and lower registers of information on the same map. In any case 
figuration is not always necessarily a confused mess of details. It is pos-
sible to 
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[…] superimpose several images in a figuration, and it would remain 
efficient, provided that the images were not very numerous, that they 
were very simple, and were differentiated in the most efficient graphic 
manner. (p 159) (author’s italics) 
 
D. Symbol Variables
The choice of map symbols must take cognizance of the kind of informa-
tion that is to be presented. Some types of symbols are well matched to 
some types of data but awkward or even wholly unsuitable for others. A 
vocabulary of graphic symbols would establish a paradigm of available 
symbol types while a grammar would guide and dictate their use. Perhaps 
the earliest work of this nature was done by Bertin (1983) in the organiza-
tion of what he referred to as the ‘retinal variables’. It is probably his most 
widely recognized contribution to cartography and graphics in general, at 
least in North America. Bertin identifies seven of these variables: location, 
size, value, texture, color, orientation, and shape. 
Bertin’s organization of symbol types has been very influential, but 
it has also been widely noted that “it simply does not always work” 
(MacEachren, 1995, p 271). The typology is in many ways incomplete, 
and a number of theorists have suggested additions and extensions to 
it. Bertin’s discussion of color, for instance, is confined to the dimen-
sion of hue and he specifically restricts it to “the repertoire of colored 
sensations which can be produced at a single value,” (1983, p 61) while 
ignoring variation in saturation entirely. Obviously, color value and 
saturation variables must be added to the list. MacEachren (1995) has 
identified Caivano’s (1990) three-dimensional system of texture (direc-
tionality, size, and density), Morrison’s (1984) element of pattern ar-
rangement and also proposed an additional tripartite element of clarity 
to address other shortcomings of Bertin’s original typology. This clarity 
element would be composed of the three dimensions of crispness, 
resolution, and transparency. MacEachren’s ‘Extended Variable Syntac-
tics’ (1995, p 279) is illustrated here (figure 2 and 3) and this syntactical 
paradigm would seem to be a useful working vocabulary of graphic 
symbols, such as we are looking to identify.
Text
The handling of text, which plays a significant role in the gestalt of the 
map graphic, is pivotal to the success of a map. This category of element 
perhaps most recognizably bridges the three registers of understand-
ing I identified at the outset of this paper. Any discussion of map names 
and text cannot easily be restricted to one register or another, but must 
of necessity touch in some manner on each simultaneously. Imhof (1975) 
observed that: 
A map sheet normally contains several hundred to several thousand 
names. Map lettering therefore, has great linguistic, practical, technical, 
and esthetic importance and we can examine the subject of map letter-
ing from vastly different points of view. Important and often difficult 
grammatical-linguistic and linguistic-geographic problems arise, as do 
questions about principals of name adoption, the number and selection 
of names. Furthermore, problems, such as the those of graphic struc-
ture, type style, type size, type appearance, type color, association of 
type with object (i.e., the establishment of a type style for each class of 
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objects), type arraignment or type position, and, finally, the actual plac-
ing of type also arise. (p 128)
 
Issues of control and hegemony over naming are dealt with latter in 
this paper, but my concern at this juncture is with the latter part of this list: 
the placement and appearance of the text on the map. 
Good name position aids map reading considerably and enhances the 
esthetics of the map. The expression ‘clothes make the man’ applied 
to cartography would be ‘good form and placing of type make the 
good map.’ Poor, sloppy, amateurish type placement is irresponsible: it 
spoils even the best image and impedes reading. (Imhof, 1975, p 129)  
 
That it is not a simple matter to avoid the poor, sloppy, and amateurish is 
quite apparent.
Figure 2. MacEachren’s expanded graphic vocabulary. Adapted from Alan 
M. MacEachren, How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and 
Design, (Guildford Press: New York, 1995), p 279. (see page 78 for color plate)
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Map lettering stands not on a uniform white ground, like the print of 
books, but in graphic competition and opposition with [other elements 
of] map design. Lettering and design are equally important and neces-
sary; therefore a compromise must be found. (Imhof, 1975, p 129) 
 
My extensive quotation of Imhof in these passages may well be noted. 
In any discussion of map text (as indeed in discussion of any number of 
topics concerned with mapping) it is impossible to ignore the precepts put 
forward by this scholar and map maker. In regard to map text, Imhof’s 
(1962) work is, in effect, the codification of the best experience of the long 
cartographic tradition. That I (and others) should lean on his guidance 
so heavily should not be wondered at; still, his precepts are not gospel. 
Maybe he himself recognized this when he wrote that “every case must be 
considered individually and then the principle to be used chosen” (1975,  
p 130). 
Figure 3. MacEachren’s visual variable syntactics. The two right hand columns represent Bertin’s “associativity” and “selectivity”. Many of 
these value assessments carry qualifications; refer to the original work for a more detailed discussion. Adapted from Alan M. MacEachren, How 
Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design, (Guildford Press: New York, 1995), p 279.
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Bumstead’s rules
 1. The visual appearance of the space 
between letters of all words of the same 
style and size must be the same.
 2. The space between letters must be 
seen to be less than the space between 
words.
 3. The space between words must be seen 
to be less than the space between lines 
of text in the information unit in which 
they appear.
 4. The space between lines of a single unit 
must be seen to be less than the space 
between lines separating units.
 5. The space between lines separating 
different units of information must be 
less than the space that surrounds that 
textural information. (p 264) 
Imhof’s principles
 1. The names should, in spite of their 
incorporation into the dense graph-
ics of the map, be easily read, easily 
discriminated, and easily and quickly 
located. Legibility depends not only on 
type form, type size, and type color but 
also on the position or arraignment of 
other names. It also depends on other 
map contents…
 2. The name and the object to which it 
belongs should be easily recognized, 
Clear graphic association often deter-
mines style, size size-gradation, and 
quality of type, as well as map content. 
Narrow-running types are gener-
ally used on small-scale maps, where 
contents are more crowded than on 
large-scale maps.
 3. Names should disturb other map con-
tents as little as possible. Avoid cover-
ing, overlapping, and concealment.
 4. Names should assist directly in reveal-
ing spatial situation, territorial extent, 
connections, importance, and differen-
tiation of objects.
 5. Type arrangement should reflect the 
classification and hierarchy of objects 
on the map: variation of style and size 
help to do this.
 6. Names should not be evenly dispersed 
over the map, nor should names be 
densely clustered. Here name selection 
and name arrangement are important. 
(p 129) 
What Imhof provides is a ‘basic set’ of principles for application. Begin-
ning with “some general principles and requirements”, he supplemented 
them with extensive discussion and example. Between them “the […] 
principles and […] directions generate clarity and legibility” (Imhof, 1975, 
p 129).
Another ‘basic set’ of guidelines for consistent and highly readable text 
is the system developed by Newman Bumstead (unpublished, referenced 
in Belbin 1996, p 262) of the National Geographic Society. Comprised of 
simple rules of thumb, easy to remember primarily because of their appar-
ently self-evident grounding in common sense, they establish a comple-
ment to the rules of Imhof. Where Imhof deals primarily with the names 
on the map, Bumstead structures the other text, although extrapolations 
of either may be applicable in any given situation (remember: “every case 
must be considered individually and then the principle to be used chosen” 
Imhof, 1975, p 129).
In considering the building blocks of the text, that is, the type itself, 
Robert Bringhurst’s (1999) work The Elements of Typographic Style is an in-
valuable resource. His approach to the use of type is very similar in spirit 
to the conventional understanding of cartography I am attempting to 
formulate here. For Bringhurst (1999), a concern for the voice of the type; 
for instance in the relationship of “the outer logic of the typography and 
the inner logic of the text” (p 20), is central. He, like I, presents rules only 
as points of departure. 
F. Summary of The Cognitive Register
To recapitulate: in this section I have identified some elements of map 
composition to constitute the core of the conventional understanding I am 
attempting to discover. Specifically, I have concentrated on the dichotomy 
of image and figuration, on a vocabulary of symbols, and on grammars for 
the use of those symbols and for text placement. As an overall theoretical 
structure for evaluation of these elements I have, as well, identified the 
tenets of Gestalt psychology. I think that the elements I have discussed 
above can be seen as central, and that other studies can be seen as sup-
porting, elaborating and furthering the understandings outlined here. 
In other words, with these tools the measure of rest may be confidently 
taken. 
III. SEMIOTIC REGISTER
 
In this section I will outline some theoretical approaches to cartographic 
communication. I begin with a discussion of the very influential math-
ematical / mechanistic model of communication, and then proceed to the 
rather more useful semiotic or sign process model. This model introduces 
the importance of interrelated codes to the operation, and I specifically 
draw attention to the intrasignificant and extrasignificant codes identified 
by Wood and Fels (1986). A discussion of the political implications in car-
tographic coding follows. There are questions raised such as, for instance, 
how and why codes are selected, and how other codes can be applied to 
change or subvert interpretation. This section ends with a discussion of 
intertextuality and how this can influence a reader’s choice of code, and 
hence the reader’s reading. 
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A. Mechanical Communication Theory
The bulk of cartographic investigation in North America, at least since 
the Second World War, has been in the cognitive, or, as the practitioners 
of the investigations would have it, scientific, vein. As a function of that 
search for a ‘scientific’ foundation, the concept of map as a communica-
tion system was seized upon by many cartographic thinkers with loud 
whoops and frequent hosannas. In the first part of Shannon and Weav-
er’s (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Weaver divides the 
problem of communication into three levels: A) the technical problem, 
(can he hear me?), B) the semantic problem (does he understand me?), 
and C) the effectiveness problem (did he do what he was told?). Weaver 
then proceeds:
So stated one would be inclined to think that Level A is a relatively 
superficial one, involving only the engineering details of good design 
of a communication system; while B and C seem to contain most if not 
all of the philosophical content of the general problem of communica-
tion. […] levels B and C, above, can make use only of those  signal ac-
curacies  which turn out to be possible when analysed at Level A. […] 
this level overlaps the other levels more than one could possible [sic] 
naively suspect. […] Thus the theory of Level A is, at least to a signifi-
cant degree, also a theory of levels B and C. (p 6)
While there is a recognition that all the categories overlap “in a rather 
vague way”,  the model remains one focused on the carrier. When Shan-
non states that “the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to 
the engineering aspects,” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p 8) Weaver chimes 
in that the reverse is not so. The information aspect of the message (and 
Weaver points out that in this usage “information must not be confused 
with meaning”, p 27) is relegated to a selection process, one of picking 
from among the range of messages available for communication. That 
message is then delivered to the “proper and discrete girl accepting your 
telegram” (p 27) and forwarded to the receiver (figure 4). It travels through 
a conduit (a wire, the ether, or, in our case, as decanted into map form) 
where it may or may not be subjected to disturbance or disruption from 
noise, but after that element is subtracted or compensated for the message 
emerges just as it entered (no doubt to be handed over by an identical 
“proper and discrete girl”).  Nowhere in the model is there any hint that 
the form of the communication itself might be a part of the message, al-
though there is a mention of a possibility of adding a “semantic noise box” 
(p 26) to the model between the information source and the transmitter 
(with a corresponding “semantic receiver” on the other end; the implica-
tion being that these ‘boxes’ are of similar if not identical programming). 
Shannon and Weaver (1949) do not, however, show these boxes in their 
diagram. 
The adaptation of this very simple system to the processes of cartogra-
phy by Kolacny (1977) of the Prague Research Institute for Geodesy and 
Cartography,(figure 5) paved the way for ever more elaborate formula-
tions. Like the endless multiplication of epicycles in the Ptolemaic cos-
mology, it always seemed that just one more step or stage in the process 
would account definitively for everything.
The discovery of these communication theories seemed to affect the car-
tographic community like the bolt that hit Saul on the road to Damascus. 
Suddenly cartographers were drawing flow charts and diagrams detailing 
the ‘Communication of Cartographic Information’  and the like. In sup-
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Figure 5. Kolacny’s Communication of Cartographic Information. From A. Kolacny, “Cartographic Information - a Fundamental Concept and Term in Mod-
ern Cartography.” Cartographica. “The Nature of Cartographic Communication: monograph no. 19.” 1977 Leonard Guelke (ed.) p 48.
Figure 4. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Adapted from Claude Shannon and William Weaver, 
The Mathematical Theory of Communication, (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1949).
port of this were calls for a redefinition of cartographic practice, nothing 
short of a placement of map making activities full square in the scientific 
domain with all the rights and high privileges attendant thereon. Joel 
Morrison (1977), of the United States Geological Survey, wrote that
A new definition [of cartography] must be formulated which will de-
lete the equating of art and technology with science. (p 58) […] Cartog-
raphy is the detailed scientific study of a communication channel. (p 
69)
At one point, the British Cartographic Association even expressed a 
desire to espouse two different definitions of cartography; one describ-
ing it for the general public as an ‘art and science’ and another definition 
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Figure 6. “A Venn Diagram Illustrating Real-
ity, R, Misconceptions of Reality, R, and Two 
Cognitive Realms A and B” From “A Venn 
Diagram Illustrating the Map in Relation to 
Reality and the Two Cognitive Realms Involved 
in Cartographic Communication”, from Joel 
Morrison, “The Science of Cartography and 
its Essential Processes” Cartographica. “The 
Nature of Cartographic Communication: mono-
graph no. 19.” 1977 Leonard Guelke (ed.), p 62.
for the ‘serious practitioner’ mentioning only scientific communication. It 
certainly must have appeared to some people that the Enlightenment had 
dawned upon cartography. 
The main problem I find with this approach to communication is 
that it would seem to mistake the signaling for the communicating. This 
tends to focus attention on the mechanical portion of a much wider and 
more complex operation. It is quite simple and seductive to imagine that 
information or messages are stacked somewhere waiting to be selected, 
packaged, and sped off to the eagerly awaiting recipient. For that simplic-
ity alone it is not surprising that such an attitude is widespread (albeit in 
perhaps not so graphic a form). There is, however, more to communication 
than that although this may not be obvious from a mechanistic standpoint. 
It does not really make things clearer that ‘communication’ is, as Richard 
Buchanan (1989) has written, “an ambiguous term often used casually and 
without regard to its many useful and sometimes conflicting meanings. (p 
91, footnote 1)” 
Even at the height of this positivist madness, however, there was a 
recognition on the part of most writers that communication with maps 
was inherently very different from the electronic communication modeled 
by Shannon and Weaver in the 1940s. In that older model, a signal trans-
mitted through a medium is degraded by interference or static: in other 
words what comes out can only be a part of what goes in, and at best the 
output can equal the input. With a map however, it is obvious that output 
can be, and often is, greater than the input. In fact, the discovery of spatial 
relationships is one of the primary reasons for mapping data in the first 
place. In some sort of recognition of this, many theoreticians included in 
their diagrams graphic boxes labeled ‘Reality’ or overlapping boxes with 
labels like: ‘map maker’s view of reality’ and ‘map user’s cognitive realm’. 
Some, such as Morrison’s (1977) “A Venn Diagram Illustrating the Map 
in Relation to Reality and the Two Cognitive Realms Involved in Carto-
graphic Communication” even made sure that the ‘view of reality’ boxes 
had some bit lying outside of the overall ‘actual reality’ box (figure 6). It 
is notable, too, that Morrison’s diagram credits the cartographer with the 
better grasp of reality, although the evidence for this assumption is not 
offered.
B. Another approach
These diagrams for the most part predated or ignored the postmodern 
critique, which among other things brought to the fore questions of the 
ownership of, and hegemony over, reality. In any case, the Procrustean 
movement to conform cartographic practice to the dictates of scientific 
positivism, even at the expense of lopping off inconvenient limbs, is not 
yet completely over. Since the time that these notions exploded upon the 
mapmaking world, however, a number of other approaches have found 
application in cartographic theory. Significant among these have been the 
tenets of semiology or semiotics, the study of signs. The late J.B. Harley of 
the University of Wisconsin played a significant role in bringing that, and 
the postmodern critique in general, to the study of cartography. His lead 
has been taken up by writers such as Wood (1992), and others. The recent 
work of MacEachren (1995) comes to mind too in this regard, where he has 
worked to reconcile these important ideas with more ‘traditional’ carto-
graphic thinking.
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In discussing semiotics, the study of signs, 
one has a choice of conceptual models and 
of associated vocabulary, much of it quite 
technical and specific. Alternatively, we 
could take the advise of Wood, quoted in 
the discussion, that in this case vocabulary 
is of secondary importance to concept as 
long as we can keep clear about what we 
mean. Rather than enumerating at length 
the various typologies of signs, or the 
Peirceian model of semiotics and Sassurian 
model of semiology, Barthes’ theories … 
and so on, I will define here a simplified 
model. It is derived from the work of the 
semiotition and cartographer Charles Sand-
ers Peirce.
 representation  = that which stands for 
the object
 object = that which is stood for: it could 
be an actual object or it could be another 
sign
 code = that which allows an interpreter to 
understand the relationship between sign 
and object (figure 7)
Figure 7. A tripartite model of sign function.
1. Semiotics
The practice of communication is an act of semiosis or sign making, and is 
the beginning of a potentially open ended process of derivation of mean-
ing.  It is going on all the time, all about us; in fact we are immersed in this 
process of semiosis. When I write the word ‘cup’, you know right away 
what I refer to; or at least you can picture many of the salient features 
of that to which I refer. You can attach the word cup to many individual 
instances of ‘cups’, many quite different in any variety of ways from other 
cups but all sharing the essential value of ‘cup-ness’. You would most 
likely not think I meant a book, but would not discount a reference to a 
hand gesture (cupped hand). The reason for this is that the word ‘cup’ is a 
sign identified or linked to the attribute of ‘cup-ness’ (an attribute shared 
by teacups and certain hand gestures but not usually associated with 
books) in the English language, which is a conventionalized code.
 This kind of analysis may, at first blush, seem a bit of a silly game; 
taking the obvious and making it obscure. The point is that only once we 
recognize how this sign making and sign using works, and see that it is 
going on all the time, can we begin to take command of the process. Wood 
(1992), formerly of the School of Design at North Carolina State University, 
made this situation and its ramifications quite clear:
This is not a game of words. Nor is the vocabulary important. What 
is important is the notion that signs, or sign-functions, or symbols 
– what they are called does not matter – are realized only when coding 
rules bring into correlation two elements or items (or functives) from 
two domains or systems (the one signifying, of expression; the other 
signified, of content) and that whenever there is such a correlation, 
there is a sign. You may call this resulting sign an icon. You may call 
it a pictogram. You may call it a word. You may call it an index. You 
may call it a symbol. You may call it a piece of sculpture. You may call 
it a sentence. You may call it a map. You may call it New York City. In 
every case, whatever else it is, it is, in its sign function, also a sign, that 
is, a creature of a code. 
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No signs without codes. This must be insisted upon: that is, there are no 
self-explanatory signs; no signs that so resemble their referents as to 
self-evidently refer to them. They are inevitably arbitrary, inevitably 
reveal... a value. (p 110)
 
It is only by looking at a map through the conventions of a large 
number of complicated code sets that we can recognize any resemblance 
between the map and what it supposedly represents. Without those 
conventions, in fact, we are unlikely to recognize the article as a map at 
all. This initial stage is, however, just a beginning in what I have already 
mentioned is a continuing process. 
2. The power of signs
Each sign potentially, and often, becomes the basis for a further step in the 
signifying process. Let us take our ‘cup’ again: let us imagine that we find 
a stylized, yet quite recognizable picture of a cup on a sign board in an 
airport. We identify it as a sign for a ‘cup’, and we know all about ‘cups’ 
from our linguistic studies (as infants, perhaps). We use this sign, which 
we directly identify with a cup (it denotes a cup), as the grist for a further 
act of semiosis. It reminds us of an association we make between a cup 
and a restaurant or cafe (in other words it connotes a restaurant); a place 
where cups are used in abundance and where food is served as well. It is 
the code or convention of such places that prompts us to expect it. Again, 
we know that very near a place selling food and drink we will find a rest 
room. It is our facile understanding of the variety of intersecting codes 
(in this case the health laws) that tells us this. Seeing the marking that we 
interpret as a cup then gives us the confidence to tell our fidgeting child 
(using a linguistic code, supplemented by tugging on their arm, which is 
another coded message) that if they hold on a few moments longer … I 
think you must get the idea. The point is that the power of signs rests in 
this ability to take part in these potentially open ended operations of con-
notation, and furthermore, that it is happening all the time. 
Maps, after all, are signs; they are both large complicated signs and a 
synthesis of constituent signs. Sometimes such complex configurations are 
referred to as super-signs, and this is a convenient way of speaking about 
them. Just as a book will have, between its covers, chapters, and within 
those chapters, paragraphs, and within the paragraphs, sentences, made in 
turn of words composed of letters, so too the map is constituted as a sign 
vehicle. A bit like a Russian doll, isn’t it?
In any event it may be misleading to speak of the power of the signs; 
the signs are the tools, the handles on the process. It is the codes that are 
doing the work. There is no possible way to leap from the sign to the 
object without the operation of the code. When the sign breaks down there 
is a localized problem, but when codes break down, general confusion 
results. Sometimes this is disastrous, as in the breakdown of the signal 
code system in the Toronto subway where no one could effectively inter-
pret the signals even on the occasions when they were working correctly. 
This lead, ultimately, to a major collision and much loss of life. At other 
times such a breakdown can be delightful or consternating, as in the case 
of Dada art. The power, then, resides in the understanding that the marks 
stand for something else in some way, and not in the marks themselves. 
The vampire is not driven off by the crossed sticks as sticks, but by the 
power that they hold in that configuration as a sign.
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3. Cultural codes
Codes come in various flavors, with varying applicabilities. All are arbi-
trary; there is no self-explanatory sign and no sign is so like its signified 
as to be coincident in any and all cases. Any code, in order to be used, 
must first be learned; but understanding of the learned codes may not be 
identical across the user community. There are, however, some code sets 
that enjoy a wide circulation and are shared by many people. These code 
sets should be adopted by the cartographer whenever possible. When the 
readership can be counted upon to understand the code, these signs are 
as close as one will ever come to being self-explanatory. These code sets 
are cultural artifacts, and in fact they make up and define their culture. 
They are not immutable, but dynamic; the active selection and usage of 
symbols within the culture keeps the associations evolving in a living way. 
When any particular symbol becomes mired in its connotations and ceases 
to evolve, it becomes a cliché. When this happens to the entire code set, 
the culture stagnates. The point is, that for any particular cultural milieu 
these code sets are powerful framers of understanding and interpretation. 
The understanding of color associations, for instance, or shapes usable for 
iconic point symbols, as another example, are embedded in a culture.
 
Our ‘dictionary’ of core visual symbols is formed through our personal 
experiences, which ‘fill up’, personalize, and expand our understand-
ing of particular symbols. (Moore, 1998, p 1) 
 
These aspects should not be ignored when choosing map symbols 
because any colloquial reading will tend to overpower any contrary one 
and usurp the meaning intended. By the same token, the dynamic nature 
and the cultural identity of the codes may lead to confusions in interpreta-
tion. The association of a particular symbol may shift over time, or may 
be quite different (or even empty) in a slightly different cultural milieu. 
The old British practice of showing the Empire on world maps in red, 
strongly evocative to an Imperial or Commonwealth subject (of a certain 
age), would be quite lost on an average American map user, for instance. 
The American could, given enough context, of course figure it out; but the 
force of the association would likely be quite different.
4. Cartographic Codes
Denis Wood and John Fels (1986) and Wood (1992) begin their search for 
the types of coding at work in maps with a deconstruction of a specific 
example: the North Carolina State Highway map. In the course of this op-
eration they identify ten cartographic codes, which they claim operate on 
and through any map, although many other codes may play various parts. 
Each code has a complex relationship to the others, but each is either ex-
ploited by the map or allows the map to be exploited (figure 8).
 
Those that the map exploits are termed codes of intrasignification. These 
operate, so to speak, within the map: at the level of language. Those 
by virtue of which the map is exploited we term codes of extrasignifica-
tion. These operate, so to speak, outside the map, at the level of myth. 
(Wood and Fels, 1986, p 68)
 
“Codes come in various flavors, 
with varying applicabilities.”
“These code sets are cultural 
artifacts, and in fact they make 
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Figure 8. Intersection of Intra- and Extrasignificant codes in the map. Adapted from Denis Wood and 
John Fels, “Designs on Signs: Myth and Meaning in Maps”, Cartographica, vol. 23, no. 3, 1986,
p 68.
The codes identified as intrasignificant, or operating within the map are:
iconic: the code of inventory, of things and of ‘events’ 
linguistic: the code of naming, identifying, ownership, classifica-
tion
tectonic: which is divisible into:
 scalar: the code of scale, the size relationship
 topological: the code of the topology, the spatial relationship (adja-
cency, connectivity, and so forth)
temporal: which is divisible into:
 durative: the code of ‘how long’, or the time ‘thickness’ (from 
when to when)
 tense: the code of ‘when is now?’
presentational: the code of presentation
This last, the presentational code, is of special significance. It is through 
this code that the map is brought into being, and so it forms the bridge 
between the realms of intra- and extrasignification. It is this code, operat-
ing “at the end and the beginning of the map, [that] closes the loop of its 
design. […] It injects the map into its culture.” (Wood, 1992, p 142) 
The map image is accompanied by a crowd of signs: titles, dates, 
legends, keys, scale statements, graphs, diagrams, tables, pictures, 
photographs, more map images, emblems, texts, references, footnotes, 
potentially any device of visual expression. The map gathers up this 
potpourri of signs an makes it a coherent and purposeful … proposition. 
[… it] takes as content the relationship among messages resident in the 
map and offers as expression a structured, ordered, articulated and ef-
fective and affective display: a legitimate discourse (Wood, 1992, p 131) 
(author’s italics) 
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This is strangely familiar, this presentational code. This is nothing other 
than visual art by another name. It is visual art which: “takes as content the 
relationship among messages resident in [whatever] and offers as expres-
sion a structured, ordered, articulated and effective and affective display: 
a legitimate discourse” (Wood, 1992, p 131) (author’s italics). The authors 
may have thought they intended something quite different from this, but 
to paraphrase the Red Queen: they couldn’t deny the correspondence if 
they tried with both hands (Carroll, 1976, p 251).  
The codes Wood and Fels (1986) identify as extrasignificant, or operat-
ing to exploit the map are:
thematic: the domain of discourse, ‘what shall be argued, what shall 
be shown?’ it operates on the iconic codes, determining a 
subject
topic: the domain of the place (topos), ‘what is this place?’ it op-
erates on the tectonic and linguistic codes, turning space 
into place
historical: the domain of the time, ‘what is the diachronic (historic) 
and synchronic (contemporary) context?’ it operates on 
the temporal codes
rhetorical: the domain of the voice, the orientation of the map in its 
culture it operates on the presentational codes 
utilitarian: the domain of how the map is, finally, used. it operates on 
any “purpose myth might serve” 
 (Wood, 1992, p 115)
I would identify the rhetorical code, as named here, with the desirability 
of the map or how the map is made desirable or appropriate for that use. 
Later I will discuss these aspects as the ethos of the map, and the affor-
dance of the ethos by the pathos.
The domains of these intra- and extrasignificant code sets are inter-
sected or focused in the map. At that place of intersection, the signs that 
operate within the map (governed by the intrasignificant codes) are 
operated upon by the codes of extrasignification; the ‘external’ codes, 
which specified what those constituent signs were, and determined how 
the intrasignificant elements were chosen in the first place. What goes 
around, comes around; and by swings and roundabouts the process 
pulls itself up by its own bootstraps. The complexity of this cycle of cod-
ing is part of the reason why the process itself is often so hard to see: it 
all seems so natural.
It is, of course, an illusion: there is nothing natural about a map. It is 
a cultural artifact, a cumulation of choices made among choices every 
one of which reveals a value: not the world, but a slice of a piece of 
the world; not nature but a slant on it; not innocent, but loaded with 
intentions and purposes; not directly, but through a glass; not straight, 
but mediated by words and other signs; not, in a word, as it is, but in... 
code. (Wood, 1992, p 108)
 
5. The ‘good man’ speaking
That maps carry a range of connotation (the text ‘between the lines’) and 
implication in addition to the strict denotative (the words on the page) 
elements of their make up is not a new concept by any stretch. It has 
been only relatively recently, though, that this has been acknowledged by 
some writers to be taking place in all maps, and not only in the products 
“What goes around, comes 
around; and by swings and 
roundabouts the process pulls 
itself up by its own bootstraps.”
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identified as ‘biased’: specifically in journalistic and propaganda maps. 
Wood (1992) points out that the inauguration in Great Britain of a “media 
watch” to identify and publicly admonish ‘poor’ mapping in the media is 
a symptom of this narrowness of acknowledgement. While on one hand 
it is laudable to undertake education of the public to an awareness of the 
editorial nature of maps, he maintains that it is precisely the specification 
of only certain types or examples of maps as being suspect that gives the 
impression of overall objectivity for maps in general as products of con-
cerned, objective map makers. The underlying objectivity of so called base 
or reference mapping, normally produced by government cartographic 
houses, is so strongly connoted as to seem axiomatic, and is so accepted 
by many people. One reason for this acceptance is the rhetorical, ethical 
appeal of the map itself (operating through the extrasignificant rhetorical 
code). It presents itself as Marcus Cato and Quintilian (Corbett, 1990, p 
601-2) suggested an ideal orator should; that is, as ‘a good man skilled in 
speaking’.  Wright (1977) wrote that 
the trim, precise, and clean-cut appearance that a well drawn map 
presents lends it an air of scientific authenticity that may or may not be 
deserved…A map may be like a person who talks clearly and convinc-
ingly about on a subject of which his knowledge is imperfect. (p 8) 
 
To a large extent the depersonalization of the map and its surround, 
the ‘clean cut appearance’ just mentioned, is responsible for this, but that 
implication is supported by other mechanisms as well. There is an implicit 
denial of the actuality of the forces at work in the authorship of any map, 
a denial that supports the mythology of veracity and objective disinterest. 
We have faith in the good intentions, the disinterested objectivity, and the 
baldly innocent disingenuous honesty of the mapping agency. Why on 
earth would these people lie? When Wright (1977) notes that “The essen-
tial accuracy of certain types of map […] can be taken on faith” (p 12), it is 
not clear if he can differentiate between accuracy and truthfulness. Even 
the supposedly fundamentally objective topographic maps put out by na-
tional governments are framed by these considerations: it has been noted 
that United States Geological Survey (USGS) maps, for instance, routinely 
show abandoned mines and omit toxic waste dumps. But do we even sus-
pect the existence of that for which there is no visible (mapped) evidence, 
or guess that it may be as (or more) important than what is shown?
Information and features are included or not on the basis of hierarchies 
of information which can have or can be formed by very widely and vari-
ously based criteria. Omission, inclusion, symbolization, generalization, 
and centrality are all factors in this process, a process that is not by any 
means always conscious or overtly intentional. In many cases the societal 
values and political forces dictating the decisions made have become in-
ternalized by the map makers and patrons, by mechanisms made familiar 
and discussed at great length by Noam Chomsky (1989) in several writ-
ings in connection with journalism, etc. It would simply not occur to either 
party to question the correctness of the implemented hierarchy. The king’s 
house is more important than the baron’s, which is more important than 
the farmer’s; what could be more natural? 
A challenge to the underlying patriotic assumption is virtually un-
thinkable within the mainstream and, if permitted expression, would 
be dismissed as a variety of ideological fanaticism, an absurdity, even if 
backed by overwhelming evidence [...] (Chomsky, 1989, p 9) 
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What is at issue is not the honesty of the opinions expressed or the 
integrity of those who seek the facts but rather the choice of topics and 
highlighting of issues, the range of opinion permitted expression, the 
unquestioned premises that guide reporting and commentary, and the 
general framework imposed for the presentation of a certain view of 
the world. (Chomsky, 1989, p 11-12)
 
Arguably, objectivity can be seen to be a subjectively infiltrated qual-
ity; but even in recognizing that fact there are pratfalls. Some people have 
found problems arising even where there seems to be an attempt on the 
part of the map-makers to acknowledge the prevalence of the tendency to 
confuse map and territory, and reality with representation. MacEachern 
(1995) points to Wood’s and Fels’ discounting of the caution from Goode’s 
World Atlas, that the reader should be careful not to take the maps too lit-
erally, as not only a warning to be on guard, but a declaration as well of a 
complementary connotation of the ethics and integrity of the map makers 
at Goode’s. This leads to a conclusion MacEachren (1995) finds “possibly 
absurd” (p 341): it is that 
a blatantly biased propaganda map is more ethical than a conscientious 
attempt to map things fairly and to warn the reader about abstractness, 
because things cannot be mapped fairly and the propaganda map does 
not falsely imply that they can, by pointing to the potential lack of fair-
ness. (p 341)
 
The point that Wood and Fels (1986) are making though, is valid:  
it is not that the map is right or wrong (it is not a question of accuracy), 
but that it is taking a stand while pretending to be neutral on an issue 
over which people are divided. (p 64)
 
In other words, should a statement of “caveat emptor” from a used car 
salesman make you trust him?
 
6. Open and closed texts
This issue of pretense highlights another interesting aspect of the map; 
that is, the openness of interpretation. Construction of the map is, in the 
intersection of the various interrelated codes, the construction of a text, an 
instrument animated by the activity of a Reader. This Reader is, in the car-
tographic code model discussed above, the bringer of the codes of utility 
to the map; s/he is the arbiter of the use made, or interpretation applied 
to, the map text. The Italian semiotician Umberto Eco (1979) identified one 
significant differentiation between types of texts as the distinction between 
an open and a closed text. Eco (1979) defines the open text as one that is 
able to transcend its context, and accommodate a variety of meanings or 
interpretations. Closed texts are highly circumscribed, in that they presup-
pose a narrowly defined reader; one who is only willing or able to bring a 
specific set of understandings to the work. In other words, the closed text 
defines its boundaries in absolute terms, beyond which it will neither step 
nor allow the reader to go. A feature of the pretense of neutrality of the 
map is a corresponding pretense of closure; a pretense of incorruptibility. 
Closed texts cannot be opened by perpetrating violence upon the closed 
structure of the text, but can occasionally be opened by subversion. Gener-
ally speaking, there must be some motivation for this: very often it is an 
ideological difference with some or all of the assumptions underpinning 
“. . . should a statement of
“caveat emptor” from a used 
car salesman make you trust 
him?”
cartographic perspectives    
     
                                33Number 45, Spring 2003
the frame. As Eco (1979) says “an ideological bias can lead a critical reader 
to make a given text say more than it apparently says […] even the most 
closed texts are surgically ‘opened’ ”
(p 22).. In fact, it is a reader not in sympathy with the original bent of the 
text that is more likely to “go further with an ideological analysis so as to 
‘unmask’ the hidden catechization performed at more profound levels” 
(Eco, 1979, p 22).  He points out how “ideological biases can act as code-
switchers […]” (p 22) as in the case of medieval interpretations of Virgil. 
We can recall how in the Divine Comedy, Dante has Virgil openly declare 
that he knew all along that Christ was on the way, and had been heralding 
that arrival in coded verse messages. Medieval scholars applied the theo-
logical constructs of Christian mythology to everything they encountered, 
including the writings of the ancients; these tenants were the unques-
tioned and unquestionable code-framework through which these scholars 
made sense of the universe. What Virgil himself might have thought about 
it all mattered not a bit.
 We can see that it is the Reader or end user who chooses and applies 
the code(s) to the text, be that text a map, a poem, or something else. In 
much the same way that we identify different phenomena and features 
by switching the wavelength sensitivity of photographic film, we can, by 
switching codes, identify very different readings of a given text. The text 
remains unchanged, as does the landscape in our photo analogy, but by 
receiving the exposure with different sensitivities we can discover other 
messages. These other messages (or images) may have been implicit, or 
been wholly or in part unsuspected by the authors. 
Is a map then really an open or a closed work? It would seem that it is 
both at the same time. Both readings are important, and both the ostensive 
‘public’ reason and a ‘subversive’ rationale can be valid and can inform 
(or ignore) each other. It seems obvious that Eco’s (1979) discussion of the 
status of art works is, in this regard, broadly applicable to cartographic 
works as well. He states that:
 
the form of a work of art gains its aesthetic validity precisely in pro-
portion to the number of different perspectives from which it can be 
viewed and understood. These give it a wealth of different resonances 
and echoes without impairing its original essence; a road traffic sign, 
on the other hand, can only be viewed in one sense, and if it is transfig-
ured into some fantastic meaning by some imaginative driver, it merely 
ceases to be that particular traffic sign with that particular meaning. A 
work of art, therefore is a complete and closed form in its uniqueness as 
a balanced organic whole, while at the same time constituting an open 
project on account of its susceptibility to countless different interpreta-
tions which do not impinge on its unalterable specificity. Hence every 
reception of a work of art is both an interpretation and a performance of 
it, because in every reception the work takes on a fresh perspective for 
itself. (Eco, 1979, p 49) 
 
7. Intertextuality
An important element in our ability to recognize or make use of any 
particular code system, and by extension to interpret or understand the 
map or any other text, is our ability to draw parallels to or inferences from 
other texts in our experience. This intertextuality is inescapable; “no text 
is read independently of the reader’s experience of other texts.” (Eco, 
1979,  p 21)  When one listens to the William Tell Overture and thinks of 
the Lone Ranger one is applying an intertextual frame of reference. In a 
“In much the same way that we 
identify different phenomena 
and features by switching the 
wavelength sensitivity of
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switching codes, identify very 
different readings of a given 
text.”
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similar manner, it is the intertextual references in Bulgakov’s (1967) novel, 
The Master and Margarita, which allow us in the first chapter to recognize 
the ‘stranger’ as Mephistopheles simply from his described appearance. 
On top of the other clues, his cane with the poodle’s head handle is a dead 
give away if, that is, we know Faust (Goethe, 1808).  In fact, later in the 
story the character of the Master expresses astonishment that an educated 
man like Berlioz (not the composer), who came to grief as a result of his 
encounter in that opening scene, failed to make the intertextual connec-
tion.  Often this intertextual frame is from far back in the memory; half 
remembered, or half misremembered. Familiarity with popular ideological 
mythology is invaluable in utilizing these powerful associations. This is 
closely related to the cultural associativity of signs, discussed earlier, and 
has similar advantages and hazards in use. 
C. Summary of the Semiotic Register
Each reader is a complex amalgam of beliefs, memories, and intellectual 
habits. The fact that all understanding is predicated on the potpourri of 
experience and emotional baggage carried about by the individual, some 
elements shared widely across a culture and other bits quite personal, 
may be good or bad, but that point is, really, immaterial. The point is that 
two things must be recognized: first, that understanding happens in an 
understandable way, and second, that this understood way can be used in 
composing the map text. 
We have seen in this section that maps are super-signs, both single 
large collective signs and organizations of constituent signs. We know 
that the power of the sign is not in the marking itself, but in the mark’s 
operation as sign in a code. Each map is only interpretable by means 
of numerous code systems, but there are, in each map, at least ten code 
sets to be found in operation. Some five of these are intrasignificant, 
operating within the map itself, and five are extrasignificant, operat-
ing to exploit the map. These codes can be, and often are, culturally 
and politically determined; both in their maker’s intentions and in any 
alternative interpretation. In any event, it is the reader or user who in the 
final instance determines the utility or use of the map, and each of these 
potential readers brings a regular dog’s breakfast of experience, mythol-
ogy and superstition to the map they use. The cartographer must, like 
James Joyce, take responsibility for all possible interpretations of his or 
her work.
IV. THE ARTISITC REGISTER
Most cartographic theorists assume there to be a clear cleavage between 
art and science. While there are dissenting voices, this distinction seems 
to be a rigid line of demarcation between partisan camps. In this section I 
will review some of the opinions that have been put forward by different 
participants in this debate, and bring in, as well, some pertinent testimony 
from literary and art circles. I am compelled at the outset to state that I am 
not entirely neutral in my opinions on this question; but by the same token 
I am not wholly given to either camp. The proponents of the exclusion of 
esthetics and art from cartography I find a bit more than slightly absurd, 
while, on the other hand, I think many of the arguments of the supporters 
of the ‘other side’ are neither properly based nor fully engaged with the 
question. My own view is that the dichotomy of art and science is a false 
one, and can clearly be seen as such from the perspective of a rhetorical 
approach to cartography.
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Cartographers often react to insinuations that they may be engaged in 
an art practice with conspicuous revulsion. Some, such as Morrison (1977), 
are quite strident in rejection of any association with art. Morrison seems 
to equate art with a penchant for invention of data, and denounces it all 
with great bombast. Other writers are only seemingly less doctrinaire. It 
has been noted, for example, that Robinson, et al.’s (1969) careful conces-
sion in Elements of Cartography that cartography is artistic, but only in the 
sense of “careful literary composition”, contains the clear implication “that 
the other art (whatever that may be), is frivolous and careless” (Morris, 
1982, p 80). There is no shortage of quotations of this sort available in the 
literature, but let us consider another, bolder statement from Elements of 
Cartography. The authors state that
 
maps today are strongly functional in the way that they are designed, 
like a bridge or a house, for a purpose. Their primary purpose is to convey 
information, or to ‘get across’ a geographical concept or relationship; 
it is not to serve as an adornment for a wall. (Robinson et al., 1969, p 7)  
(my italics)
 
Well, it could be argued that sometimes a map is ‘just’ an adornment for 
a wall (and it adorns that wall, like any trophy, for a very specific reason 
which is in fact to get something across), but it is clear that the authors’ 
primary implication is that were the cartographer an artist (by their defini-
tion), the map would somehow be something less than it should or might 
be. That even the authors realize this assertion to be rather untenable can 
be seen by their next statement:
On the other hand, one of the cartographer’s concerns may be to keep 
from producing an ugly map; in this respect he is definitely an artist, 
albeit in a somewhat negative sense. (Robinson, et al., 1969, p 7)
  
 What is this ugliness that the cartographer as inverted artist is at-
tempting to avoid? What can this ugliness be, if not a crippling of the very 
fabric of the map as a means of communication, as a sign, and in fact, of 
all rationales for producing a map? The authors of Elements of Cartography 
are identifying a real concern, even if their thinking about it is a bit fluffy. 
Obviously the cartographer, in order to successfully “convey information, 
or to ‘get across’ a geographical concept or relationship” (Robinson, et al., 
1969, p 7)  must engage in an art practice. “It concerns”, as Pound (1960) 
says, “the relation of expression to meaning” (p 34).
 One could draw an analogy to the geometrical operation of the projec-
tion of the globe. The surface of the globe must be translated in some man-
ner, made accessible through the language of geometry (a convention), 
in order to appear upon a sheet of paper. So too must all the information, 
features, and so forth be translated through the constructs of a convention-
alized code, something that is often referred to as a language, to even ap-
pear (let alone appear coherently) on the graphic. The geometry takes care 
that the relative position is correct (as it does in a painting like Masaccio’s 
Trinity (1425-1428) fresco in Florence, (figures 9a and b), but the question at 
hand is what the representation will be, how will (can) it be expressed? It 
should be obvious to everyone that:
 
the ‘statesman cannot govern, the scientist cannot participate [sic] his 
discoveries, men cannot agree on wise action without language’, and 
all their deeds and conditions are affected by the defects or virtues of 
idiom. (Pound, 1960, p 34)
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Figure 9a. Perspective diagram 
of Masaccio’s Trinity fresco in S. 
Maria Novella, Florance, from James 
Smith Pierce, From Abacus to Zeus: 
a handbook of art history, (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
1977) p 40.
Figure 9b. Diagram deduced from 
Masaccio’s Trinity showing the 
ground plan of the chamber and the 
surface of the barrel vault. From 
James Smith Pierce, From Abacus 
to Zeus: a handbook of art history, 
(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: 1977) p 41.
Yet, when it comes to the cartographer acknowledging, or, it would 
seem, even recognizing the language s/he employs so well or ill in daily 
endeavor, revulsion intervenes. To believe that one can even begin to 
compose, construct, assemble, put together, or otherwise ‘come up with’ a 
map without recourse to the language of art is patently absurd, and only 
little wit can excuse such a hallucination. On the other hand, to realize that 
one’s grasp of that language may be less than it might be, or even quite 
rudimentary, is perfectly rational.
In some ways this examination of the means of utterance is not unlike 
the examination of the operation of the sign and of the code systems I 
discussed in the last section. The fact that we make use of it so intimately, 
and have assimilated it so completely into our mechanisms of viewing 
and operating in the world makes it seem almost absurd to look at it as a 
separate thing. 
Since, as Lawrence Durrell (1976) noted: “what one becomes one for-
gets”, a way must be found to begin to examine these workings.  Pound 
(1960) advised the reader: 
For the sake of keeping a proportionate evaluation, it would be well 
to start by thinking of the different KINDS of expression, the different 
WAYS of getting meaning into words, rather than of particular things 
said or particular comments made.  The term ‘meaning’ cannot be 
restricted to strictly intellectual or ‘coldly intellectual’ significance. The 
how much you mean it, the how you feel about meaning it, can all be 
‘put into language’ (p 47-8) 
“To believe that one can even 
begin to compose, construct, 
assemble, put together, or 
otherwise ‘come up with’ a map 
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My intention here is to show that we do make use of the language or ex-
pression of visual art in making any map, and perhaps to make clear that 
it is advantageous to acquire such a literacy.
The ‘how you feel about meaning it’ and ‘how much you mean it’, as 
Pound notes, is central, but perhaps that word “feel” is problematic for 
some. Feeling is “… not only a sensation of pleasure but a real judgment 
concerning the excellence of the object” (Reid, 1774). As soon as you prefer 
one means, option, or version to another, as soon as you make a judgment 
(for whatever ‘reason’ that judgment is made), you are ‘feeling’ some-
thing.
The very mention of feeling or art will make many cartographers jump. 
It is as if each can feel the bite of Swift’s (1733) oft-quoted verses: 
So Geographers in Afric-maps
With Savage-Pictures fill their Gaps;
And o’er uninhabitable Downs
Place Elephants for want of Towns. (p 571) 
 
For instance, much embarrassment has been expended on the elaborate 
and ornate decoration of historical maps, which in practice means almost 
any from before the late 19th century, Often this manner of presentation 
has been equated with the art part of the ‘art and science’ of cartography.  
Jean Morris (1982) noted that
Most believe […] that the science of a map is to be found in its empiri-
cal data and the art in extra embellishments. The layman’s view of 
cartographic art includes rose compasses, elaborate calligraphy, and 
illustrations of the exotic beasts and sailing ships that filled the empty 
spaces of the maps of long ago. Artwork then was required to take over 
where science failed. (p 41) 
 
More lately the postmodern critique, pioneered in cartography by the 
work of Harley, has allowed us to place the styling of antique maps in an 
understandable context, as part of the rhetoric of the map as a whole. As 
well, the reinvestigation of decoration as an integral aspect of object mak-
ing should lead to further re-evaluation of these maligned works.  David 
Brett (1992) of University of Ulster in Northern Ireland has been particu-
larly instrumental in this re-thinking of the place decoration. Brett writes 
of how
Modernization – in which industrial production and a science-based 
technology are allied to the growth of mass education and bureau-
cracy – requires the destruction of age-old habits of thought and 
behavior. Thereafter ‘traditional’ culture becomes a very problematic 
area whose continued existence has to be defended, asserted, and in 
certain cases even invented. The study of decoration reveals this pro-
cess very clearly, and demonstrates some of the political and social 
tensions that ensue. The history of the decorative arts in the past one 
hundred and fifty years can be analyzed in terms of contrasting ideo-
logical positions whose roots are in the struggle for mastery within 
sections of the dominant class. These roots are also deeply embedded 
in the intellectual foundations of modernism and in particular the 
disruption of culture and qualitative thought by scientific positivism, 
which, by undermining the basis of metaphor, renders traditional 
symbolism invalid, and any decoration based upon it meaningless. 
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An example of the development and 
growth of this visual language can be seen 
in comparing some visual aspects of two of 
the famous ‘Adventures of Tintin’ stories: 
The Crab with the Golden Claws (Hergé, 1941)  
(a fairly early tale) and The Picaros (Hergé, 
1976)  (the last complete story). There are 
many visual (and other) differences, but 
let us look at the technique employed in 
composing the individual frames. In The 
Crab the frames are spacious, with full 
figures placed across a rather flat stage with 
a shallow plane of action. With The Picaros, 
however, the frames are crowded, with 
many dominated by a large head, perhaps 
with a gesturing hand, the speech balloon, 
and an action field of depth. What hap-
pened to the visual language between these 
two examples? Television is what happened: 
by the 1970s the framing conventions of the 
small noisy box have taught Hergé’s read-
ers to understand what they are seeing. This 
kind of framing has become a part of the 
visual grammar and vocabulary; the ability 
to read such a construct is now an en-
trenched part of the common visual literacy. 
Similarly, contemporary video camera tech-
nique: hand held shots, jump cuts, etcetera, 
which would have been deeply disturbing 
to an audience in 1960 are commonplace 
today because, again, the visual language 
has evolved. Now, if Pop Art showed us 
nothing else, it was the primacy of the com-
mon visual literature (and Andy Warhol, 
one incidentally recalls, was a great admirer 
of Hergé). A comparison of Bertin’s map 
multiples with Warhol’s multiple image 
works such as Sixteen Jackies (Warhol, 1965) 
is also instructive.
Thus, the study of decoration becomes part of the study of the many 
ways in which modern society searches for its meanings. (p 3) 
However, it is not specifically to embellishment that I refer when I speak 
of the map as functioning as art.
A. Art as a language
Maps, it seems to me, have held on to the imagination and awe of the 
large majority of the population while fine art products in general have, 
since the middle of the nineteenth century, slowly lost that hold. This is a 
proposition which I think would bear further investigation. The attraction 
that maps hold for large numbers of individual viewers is well known and 
long noted. Witness Blundeville’s (1589) observation, already quoted: “I 
daylie see many that delight to looke on Mappes…” (To the reader).  The 
engagement each individual makes with a map is varied and complex, 
and often entered into for no other reason than the pleasure that engage-
ment affords. Very seldom is tabular data perused in the manner that a 
graphic representation of the spatial relationships between features will 
be. That this happens too, for reasons beyond the mere efficiency of pre-
sentation, is evident because one will look at a map even when the subject 
or theme is of little or no interest. The motivations for this are, I believe, 
rooted in the same attraction that art holds.
That we learn and understand a visual language, that is, that our 
understanding of the world around us is mediated by visual codes with 
shared vocabularies and grammars, is commonly understood and accept-
ed (except, it must be noted, in some cartographic literature). (see sidebar) 
Visual art feeds on and is fed by this visual language. The production of 
works by means of visual language is an art activity; cartography is an 
activity producing works by means of visual language; ergo… 
It is to this understanding of the production of cartographic works that 
I look when seeking the ‘artistic element’ in cartography. It is not some-
thing ‘added in’, or present in a greater or lesser amount or degree, but is 
instead intimately bound up in the activity. This is not to imply that it is 
always well or even adequately handled.
There has long endured a camp in cartography which held out for the 
quality they recognized in maps as esthetic, or identifiable as art. Often 
the proponents of these views are branded as ‘Romanticists’, and thought 
of as stubbornly prejudiced against the sound and reasonable ‘Scientists’; 
and it is true that “…the despoilers of science end up sounding a bit 
silly and slightly hysterical. That, regrettably, is what is thought of them 
already by those in power” (Morris, 1982, p 48).  It can be a tight corner to 
fight from, though. 
It is very difficult to make people understand the impersonal indigna-
tion that a decay of writing can cause men who understand what it 
implies, and the end whereto it leads. It is almost impossible to express 
any degree of such indignation without being called “embittered” or 
something of that sort. (Pound, 1960, p 34) 
 
Pound’s (1960) words are directly applicable to this situation. It can be 
very difficult to make a stand for the importance of something like art in 
cartography when so many otherwise accomplished, or at least admired, 
theorists and practitioners so roundly denounce it. 
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B. The millstone of prejudice
Could it all stem from something as simple as a misunderstanding? There 
is certainly no shortage of misunderstanding in which to root the problem. 
I am convinced that one reason authorities such as Bertin discount the 
importance of the artistic register in cartography is simply that the quali-
ties I identify with art are not recognizable to them as such. These aspects, 
for them, would simply be self-evident marks of good practice, as familiar 
as the air, and the understandings so entrenched in their procedures and 
psyches as to be of second nature. Because they have identified art as be-
ing a practice they reject, they cannot recognize the artistic nature of the 
practice they pursue. It may seem petty to object to what someone calls 
their practice, if, as I have said, it is only a matter of a rose by any other 
name. It is, however, against the prejudice, grounded on so slim a nicety of 
vocabulary that I chafe. It is far easier to learn a categorical condemnation 
than a skill. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1773) wrote about just these 
sort of prejudices in his 1773 work On German Architecture. Upon his first 
visit to the Strasbourg cathedral he confesses that he had his:
head full of general ideas about good taste. From hearsay I honored the 
harmony of masses, the purity of shapes, and I was a decided enemy of 
the confused arbitrariness of Gothic ornamentation. Under the heading 
of Gothic, as though in the entry in a dictionary, I heaped all the syn-
onymous misunderstandings that had ever crossed my mind as to the 
indistinct, the disorderly, the unnatural, the overloaded, the patchwork 
[…] (p 297)
The indistinct, the disorderly, the unnatural, the overloaded, the patch-
work, the unscientific, the boutique, the artsy, the fartsy. Art in this context 
could almost be seen as cartography’s dirty little secret. 
C. Some defenders
Not everyone associated with maps always breaks out in a rash at insinu-
ations of art.  Thrower (1966) and even Robinson (1967), each in separate 
Yearbook of Cartography articles from the mid nineteen-sixties discussing, 
respectfully, “Relation and Discordancy in Cartography” and “Psychologi-
cal aspects of color in Cartography”, found that there is a place and need 
for at least “the cartographic equivalent of the ability of the truly great 
communicative artists in other fields, be it speaker, writer, painter, or what 
you will” (Robinson, 1967, p 57). One man unafraid of the stigma, or per-
haps I should say, less afraid than most, was John Keates.  Keates (1984) 
raised “the question of whether a map can be said to have any of the at-
tributes of a work of art, and whether the attempt to create such works is a 
proper Cartographic objective” (p 38). Keates maintains that it can indeed 
be said, and goes on to point out “that there is more to a map than some-
thing vaguely called information […] which is in no way contrary to the 
need to make maps which are functionally informative”
(p 39). His objective in the article is to investigate whether maps can, or 
should, arouse an aesthetic response. Decidedly, Keates is acknowledging 
something fundamentally important here, and doing it quite eloquently, 
yet he backs away at crucial points. I have difficulty agreeing with him, for 
instance, when he states that  “as the actual arraignment and interplay of 
contours, lines and shapes on a map is ordered by the phenomena, maps 
would appear to have little to offer from a formalist point of view” (p 40).  
Formal concerns can and do play as significant a role in the generaliza-
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tion and representational processes in cartography as in other art making. 
Portraiture certainly comes to mind here as an analogues situation, for 
instance the recent portrait heads by the British sculptor William Tucker. It 
is also problematic when Keates writes that “a map can be ‘well designed’ 
in a functional sense without creating anything of the aesthetic property 
we can sense in other things” (p 41). He seems to be saying that art is, in 
the end, something that really need not be present in the map. How he can 
come to this conclusion is not immediately obvious.
Other writers on the relation of art and cartography, however, seem 
to approach the topic with rather more confused notions. Discussions of 
‘beauty’ (objective and / or subjective), the golden section, and so forth, 
are generally less helpful as they are the less well informed. Most writers 
are careful to point up something along the line that ultimately the ‘artistic 
element’ or “beauty … is not put into a map but merely added to it” (Kars-
sen, 1980, p 124).  I do not, however, think it appropriate to sneak art in 
through the back door, so to speak. No apologies are required for a mature 
and accomplished body of knowledge and practice. Embarrassment and 
apology should come, rather, from the cartographer without a conver-
sant understanding of art and his own activities. The work itself must in 
the end speak, and the cartographer can do no more than to prepare that 
voice. “When the writing is masterly one does NOT have to excuse it or to 
hunt up the reason” (Pound, 1960, p 51). 
D. Defining a faith in art
Without doubt contemporary post- postmodern uncertainties surrounding 
definitive definitions of art and science practice do little to clarify things. It 
does, however, seem apparent that this uncertainty also makes the rein-
vestigation and the rehabilitation of cartography as a meeting ground of 
art, science, and technology a more viable proposition than has seemed 
likely in recent years. Perhaps by defining that relationship we will be bet-
ter positioned to tackle the wider questions.
The American Early Modernist writer Williams Carlos Williams (1937) 
grappled with questions of this sort when he outlined a dialog between 
the poet and his brother.
My brother, who is an architect, told me recently that his mind has 
been aflame over the problems of construction today more than ever 
before. Upon what shall we base our judgments? he said to me almost 
in despair. You are a writer, he said, I’d like to know how you work. 
What do you find to be of importance? We must both be looking for 
more or less the same things. Tell me how you go about it. (p 175)
There is a fundamental similarity of the problems and aims of construc-
tion faced by the physical and the linguistic builder.  The similarity is 
shared by the constructor of a graphic, and specifically (for our discussion 
here) of the composer of a map. If we recall Robinson et al.’s (1969) recog-
nition that maps “are designed, like a bridge or a house, for a purpose”,
p 7) then it will be plain that this should be a by no means novel concept 
to the cartographer.
You build houses, for people. Poems are the same. 
Yes, I know, he said. But I’m sick of this ‘back to humanity - back to the 
soil’ business. You grow spinach in the soil, you don’t grow writing 
there and certainly it doesn’t sprout little new buildings ready-made. 
“Williams Carlos Williams 
(1937) grappled with questions 
of this sort . . .”
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Neither does humanity. Architecture is an art and writing is an art also, 
mossy with tradition. 
Who said anything else? What I said was that I go back to people. They 
are the origin of every bit of life that can possibly inhabit any structure, 
house, poem or novel of conceivable human interest. It doesn’t precise-
ly come out of the tops of their heads like flowers but they represent, 
in themselves, the structure which art... Put it this way: If we don’t 
cling to the warmth which breathes into a house or a poem alike from 
human need –
The stink, you mean. 
 
– the whole matter has nothing to hold it together and becomes struc-
turally weak so that it falls to pieces. 
Possibly, but I don’t follow you. 
Maybe I don’t follow myself, it’s always a possibility. You began by 
telling me about a craftsmanlike integrity to ones materials. No lying. 
But that’s no incentive to either build or write – no safe incentive, that 
is. […] I mean you build a house for people, don’t you ? Then the needs 
of... I mean, the minute you let yourself be carried away by purely 
‘architectural’ or ‘literary’ reasoning without consulting the thing from 
which it grew, you’ve cut the life-giving artery and nothing ensues but 
rot. 
(Williams, 1937, p 178)  
In many ways this is not dissimilar to the calls made by many in the 
cartographic community for the recognition “that there is more to a map 
than something vaguely called information” (Keates, 1989, p 39); calls 
that are often sneered down by those who fancy themselves to be ‘seri-
ous’ practitioners. However, that which constitutes this so styled ‘seri-
ous’ practice, exactly like that which Williams identifies as the “purely 
‘architectural’ or ‘literary’”, is inadequate as a fundamental basis for the 
activity; “– no safe incentive, that is” (Williams, 1937, p 178).  It is easy 
and hence quite usual to mistake a concern with matters broader than the 
so-called ‘pure’ with the frivolous and extraneous; just as it is not uncom-
mon to characterize Pablo Picasso as a messy scribbler. But, like the codes 
discussed previously, operating at a less than obvious level is not the same 
as to not be present: what is engaged is visceral and speaks directly to us 
and to our needs.
What we seem to be getting to is that all the arts have to come back to 
something. 
And that that thing is human need. When our manner of action 
becomes imbecilic we breed Dada, Gertrude Stein, surrealism. These 
things seem unrelated to any sort of sense UNTIL we look for the 
NEED of human beings. (Williams, 1937, p 178-9)  
As Williams says, we must look for that need. The need may well be, 
and often is, for a National Topographic System 1:50,000 sheet: such a map 
speaks in a voice and tongue which responds to that need (or persuades 
us that it is responding). However, no matter how often or how well it 
does respond it remains only an option; a single choice among many; a 
“. . . operating at a less than 
obvious level is not the same as 
to not be present . . .”
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possible answer for today’s need. The seduction of the ‘pure’ thinking, be 
it architectural, literary, or cartographic, is to calcify and to catechize and 
in the end, like Procrustes, to make the problem fit the answer.
[…] we find that these apparently irrelevant movements of art repre-
sent mind saving, even at moments of genius, soul saving, continents 
of security for the pestered and bedevilled spirit of man, bedevilled by 
the deadly, lying repetitiousness of doctrinaire formula worship which 
is the standard work of the day. In my young days it was ‘English.’ 
In your young days it was ‘Greece,’ ‘Rome.’ But the mind is merely 
enslaved by these ideals, these ideas, unless we can relate them, here, 
now, in our environment, to ourselves and our day. This requires in-
vention. ... 
Wait a minute! Wait a minute! You forget you are a writer, I am an 
architect. You are working with words. I am working with building 
materials. We have to have rules which shall govern us. I grant you 
that we have to have universal rules – that will work today just as they 
worked to produce the marvels of antiquity – but they’re rules just the 
same. 
As far as I’m concerned I don’t think they’re any different from human 
character in service to the inauguration [sic]. 
You mean that art should be useful? 
Stuck your foot out that time, didn’t you? But I didn’t trip. Yes, useful. 
They try to deny it. There’s an arrogance in art that likes to set itself up 
against the world. 
(Williams, 1937, p 179)  
Utility and non-utility is targeted here as argument. The point is that of 
the reclamation of that which is not useless, but only identified as useless 
by others as a part of their circumscription of the bounds of valid debate. 
Be that as it may, and setting aside the ‘utility of non-utility’ point as a side 
issue (as Williams clearly does), we return to the main question in this pas-
sage; is art useful?
But I insist, yes, that the purpose of art IS to be useful. 
[…] every minutest thing that is part of a work is good only when it is 
useful and […] any other explanation of the ‘work’ would be less use-
ful than the work itself. 
(p 179-180)
Williams then examines the process of creation by considering the 
approach to the project at hand, making use of what I interpret to be 
the rhetorical design control elements, applying them, in this case, to 
an architectural project although they are just as applicable to a carto-
graphic project.
Anyhow houses do have to be lived in physically. That makes a big 
practical difference But wait a minute, maybe I am the one who should 
be learning, from you. A man comes to you and wants a house, What 
“The seduction of the ‘pure’ 
thinking . . . is to calcify and 
to catechize and in the end, like 
Procrustes, to make the problem 
fit the answer.”
“The point is that of the
reclamation of that which is 
not useless, but only identified 
as useless by others as a part 
of their circumscription of the 
bounds of valid debate.”
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happens? Some will belie their materials and do anything the client 
asks. But you’re an architect, what would you do? 
I wouldn’t sell out, I’d rather lose the commission – and do lose them 
very often for that reason – rather than lie. 
I know. But what would you ‘do,’ you, yourself, while the man is still 
in the act of making his proposal to you. You’d start on the house, in 
your mind, I mean, constructing it, as it must be FOR CERTAIN REA-
SONS. Isn’t that right? 
Yes, of course. 
(p 180-1) 
This is a critical point. Later, we will see how this is in fact the inven-
tion of the logos, or logical appeal. It is those ‘CERTAIN REASONS’ which 
determine that the house, poem, or map shall be useful.
Nine cases out of ten you’d have the thing up there inside your head 
within the first ten minutes. 
That’s right. 
Then so far it’s just like a poem. After that, hungry for work, you’d 
look at the man, inwardly, and size him up as to just what he amount-
ed to in your mind, architecturally speaking. 
Yes. 
(p 181) 
Williams has determined that he would provide something of a 
specific use, something useful (logos), and must now consider further. 
How will this client make use of it; how will he find it useable (what is the 
pathos)? Next, the client must choose to have that particular house built 
and not another; how does he determine that this particular  house is bet-
ter than all the others? In other words, how shall that house be shown to 
be desirable (ethos)? 
After that you’d go to work on him to get what YOU wanted. Isn’t that 
right?
That’s right. I would – with my heart in my mouth. 
(p 181)  
Once the architect (poet, or cartographer) has these design control 
elements in hand, the argument can then be put forward. It is a matter of 
persuasion: ‘human character in service’.  Note that the persuasion is not 
effected here, at the end; the arguing is not a hoodwinking of the client 
to buy a pig in a poke, but has instead been framed and accomplished by 
the elements which are already in play. The logos or logical appeal is the 
conception of the edifice ‘as it must be FOR CERTAIN REASONS’. The 
pathetic and ethical appeals (pathos and ethos) are dealt with in the ‘siz-
“It is a matter of persuasion: 
‘human character in service’.”
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ing up’ of the client: how will s/he find the edifice (in Williams’ example) 
so usable and desirable as to commission it?
What else does a poet do? And how can I tell you anything about it? It 
isn’t only the tensile strength of the materials. It isn’t just ‘honesty.’ It 
isn’t standard lengths and all that. It’s everything in the world today. 
First it’s human character that decides. Your character, the quality of 
your client. The only difference with poetry is that the poet builds for 
an everybody, any person, while you build for everyone in one person. 
All the modern necessities, the social needs, the falsification of thought, 
the constrictions of vile habit. The architect is a rebel just as I am. He 
should be a philosopher, a sociologist, he must have read Thorstein 
Veblen. He must know human habits, eccentricities. But above all he 
must know how to put it over. 
(Williams, 1937, p 181) 
And what a cartographer does is, again, no different in its essential 
aspects. Williams points out that it is not circumstantial or happenstance 
differences of material or implementation which are central to any of these 
activities. There is instead a central correspondence identifiable under the 
obscuring layer of the circumstantial; it is a question of knowing ‘how to 
put it over’. What, though, is it?
 … of course you know what ‘it’ means.
I know what ‘it’ means well enough, when I find a thing, said the 
Duck: it’s generally a frog, or a worm. The question is, what did the 
archbishop find? 
(Carroll, 1976, p 36)
In the case of our discussion here, ‘it’ is the persuasive argument as put 
forward in the map. 
Nowhere in any of this is an equation of persuasion with deception, 
which is not to imply that deception is not present at one or more levels.
Fine! But what ‘art’ means to most seems to be the art of deceit. If they 
flatter a client and give him what he wants they feel that they don’t 
give up their franchise as an artist. On the contrary, they’re doing 
something human, they’re employing their hard-earned structural skill 
to bring into effect the bare demands he makes of them – 
The commercial artist, so-called. 
Some are pretty good, too. 
Why not? provided they can adapt the client’s needs to their own neces-
sities. This applies also to propaganda. 
I’d solve the problem architecturally till hell freezes over – or not at all. 
 (Williams, 1937, p 182). 
This is critical, and incidentally raises certain ethical questions about 
the undertaking of another’s argument for them. The arguments advanced 
in the map are not, of course necessarily, or even very often, that of the 
cartographer personally but are instead those of the client. We have only 
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to remember Socrates and Gorgias’ discussion of the validity of making 
the worse case appear the better to warn ourselves of the dangers of that. 
However, the point here is not the judgment of the relative validity of any 
particular arguments forwarded by maps, but rather that an argument is 
always forwarded.
You know, you’ve made me think. Propaganda is like a house an archi-
tect has to build for people to live in. Maybe your client is a damn fool, 
maybe he isn’t. You’ve got to argue with him – broadly speaking. That 
broadens the whole matter, doesn’t it? Only we’re so damned beset 
with hangovers and dragbacks. They’ve got to live in them, the houses, 
poems, we make – but they don’t even know they’re houses. Their 
needs govern it but in such a complex manner that it flies out of the 
mind and nobody knows what it is about. But we’ve got to come back 
to it, from both sides. The poet has to serve and the reader has to – be 
met and won – without compromise. 
But how? 
(Williams, 1937, p 182-3) (my italics)
Williams touches on several points in these passages, which are funda-
mental to what must make up our understanding of the functioning of art 
in our work in its broadest sense, and in cartography in particular.
What is the question I am harping on here? Is this an attempt to glo-
rify cartography by claiming the status of art, or conversely, to attempt 
to escape from considerations of ‘scientific accuracy’ by implying that, as 
art, one needn’t be concerned with the discipline or tyranny of precision? 
I would reply neither, and that such a choice is not relevant because the 
demands of high quality data and high quality presentation are two facets 
of the same prism, and the one is lost without the other. 
E. Appropriate presentation
The artist Jenny Holtzer (1985) is noted for her works in which texts 
function simultaneously as form and message. There is a complex inter-
play between the presentation, the communication and the content of the 
message that is especially piquant in regard to this present study.  In an 
interview Holtzer (1985) considered whether criticism of content should 
supersede criticism of formal issues; although she refers specifically to her 
own work, the parallel to our consideration of cartography is clear.
Best of all would be a criticism that remarks on all aspects of the work. 
For the art to be successful, and for that matter, for the content to be 
compelling, the subject must be presented in a way that’s compelling, 
the subject must be presented in a way that is appropriate. Appropri-
ate means that formal considerations have been attended to, that they 
are as marvelous as the message. That’s what the artist has to shoot for, 
and that’s what the critics need to recognize and describe. 
(Holtzer, 1985, p 66) 
This concept of the appropriate presentation is precisely what is re-
quired. We can draw connections between this to Wood’s ‘presentational 
codes’ by recalling our discussion of how the intrasignificant presentation-
al codes act as a bridge, and thus allows the map to enter a culture. What 
is under consideration here is precisely how it manages to do that.
“. . . the point here is not the 
judgment of the relative
validity of any particular
arguments forwarded by maps, 
but rather that an argument is 
always forwarded.”
“. . . Holtzer (1985) considered 
whether criticism of content 
should supersede criticism of 
formal issues . . .”
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F. Function
Many definitions of art include some qualification of the maker’s ‘inten-
tion’, and it is a common assumption that an ‘intention’ to ‘function’ is a 
disqualification for, or incompatible with an ‘intention’ to make art. But 
what then is functionality, and at what level of content or competency of 
function is the line of disqualification: where is the foul line and how is 
it crossed?  The problem here lies, I think with the question itself. Rudolf 
Arnheim (1986) pressed directly on the root of such questions when he 
wrote that
In philosophical aesthetics, tedious pseudoproblems have been intro-
duced by dichotomous thinking.  […] None of these questions can be 
answered by an either/or decision.
If instead one starts from the realization that the properties of the work 
of art reside in all its various embodiments, one arrives at an interest-
ing and manageable problem. One can ask: In what ways do the vari-
ous manifestations partake in the work, each in its own manner?
(p 276)
There are certain parallels between my views on the manner in which 
maps function and the way I thought about my sculpture work in the 
1970s and 80s. The concept of functionality is central to both practices but 
any function in and of itself is not a point of definitive determination of 
the work’s status as art, whether that function is integral to the work as 
a whole or not. A common conception tends to expect non-functionality 
of art and to see functionality as an indication or attribute of the non-art. 
Little, however, could be further from the truth. It is not an issue of yea or 
nay, but instead a question of what that particular function is, and where it 
is aimed. 
G. Embodiment
If we look at a painting and consider the manner in which the image is 
constructed or ‘made up’ we discover the same, or a parallel kind, of 
vocalization or expression through the language of representation as we 
find in a map. Let us examine this vocalization by supposing that we 
were setting out to make a painting of ‘American History’. Not, say, a 
picture of some specific or particular event such as Washington crossing 
the Delaware, Lee at Appomattox, or John Mitchell committing perjury, 
but instead something more general: a painting of ‘American History’ 
itself. How might one evoke this thing without particularizing the im-
agery, and thus narrowing the scope? Color could be the key; one could 
make exclusive use of colors evocative of ‘American History’. But how 
is one to decide what colors these might be? A visit to the local paint 
store will provide us with a little card of paint chips, samples of colors 
of interior paints with names like ‘Newport Brown’ and ‘Appalachian 
Fern’; indeed, they are part of this particular paint company’s ‘Historic 
Color Series’! So, we have an extensive set of colors, collectively and 
each separately connected in some manner (for someone, at any rate), 
with ‘American History’, but how do we set about ordering them upon 
our painting? If we were composing a landscape of Mi Lai, or a portrait 
of Sacco and Vanzetti, we would have a framework in place already to 
determine which color would lie alongside of which other. However, 
these types of framework were rejected earlier on in the process. The key 
to the colors’ evocation of ‘American History’ is in the name given to 
“Let us examine this
vocalization by supposing that 
we were setting out to make a 
painting of ‘American
History’.”
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each color, so it would make sense to order the colors based upon some 
aspect of these names; for instance, the length of the name. Again it fol-
lows that an order based upon the length of the names could be logically 
presented as a list or stack; we could have the longest name at the bot-
tom and the shortest name at the top. Okay, we are making great prog-
ress here: we have the colors, and we have them ordered. Let us now 
give some thought to the colored marks themselves. If the length of each 
paint stroke was proportionate to the length of the name (and by exten-
sion to its place in the order) this conceptual structure would be consoli-
dated. The name of the color could, perhaps, be painted over that color, 
helping to clarify the interrelationships, and the size of that text string 
could determine precise height and width of the paint mark. Marking 
the name of each color in characters of the color of the paint stroke just 
below serves to tie the work together as a whole. Of course the upper-
most paint color would be used for the text of the bottom stroke, closing 
the circle (and isn’t history cyclical?).
There are other decisions yet to be made; type-face and letter-spacing, 
for instance, but my purpose here is not to make the painting (in fact, 
Garry Neill Kennedy (1989) already has made this painting, in various 
versions on various occasions), but to illuminate the conceptual process 
of the making. It should be pointed out as well that this outline is my 
conception of how I would go about constructing this painting, and it is 
a procedure which may or may not have been in any way similar to that 
followed by the artist. 
My point is that this conceptual process is present, more or less obvi-
ously, more or less overtly, in all compositional making regardless of 
differences in pictorial detail, overt intention or ideological grounding. 
Vermeer (1669), in his painting Geographer (figure 10), undertook the same 
conceptual process; he was asking superficially different questions, ap-
plying different valuations and criteria, and aiming for something quite 
specific (and not so self -conscious, -referential, and -aware), but nonethe-
less in all essential aspects it was the selfsame conceptual undertaking. 
Malcolm Lowey did this with automobiles and locomotives. We do this 
when we compose a map. We are foregrounding something quite specific 
in each case, and while normally it is not the conceptual process itself 
which is awarded centrality in our valuation mythologies, it is imperative 
that the presence and function of that process be acknowledged if we are 
to understand the activity in which we are engaged. 
H. Divergence
I think that in former days the association between cartographic and 
artistic activity was not unclear, and in fact it was the distinction that 
was not defined. That the innovations in the optical rendering of space in 
Renaissance painting were not reflected by a corresponding advance in 
geodetic measurement, until relatively recent times, had a significant effect 
on the divergence of association since the time of Mercator and Ortelius. 
Developments in cartography tended to take some time to occur. Remem-
ber, although Giovanni Cassini began the topographic survey of France in 
1669, it was his great-grandson Jean who directed preparation of the last 
of the 182 sheets in 1793. Pendulum clocks had been used in determining 
the longitude of fixed points of observation since 1657, but real locational 
accuracy on demand anywhere on the globe had to await John Harrison’s 
completion of his Chronometer Number Four in 1759. It was this instru-
ment, which eventually (some 13 years later) won the award from the 
Board of Longitude for ‘discovering the Longitude’. Of course, there then 
      4 Number 45, Spring 2003 cartographic perspectives    
Figure 10. Vermeer, Geographer 1669. Frankfurt, Stadelsches Kuntstinstitut.
remained the (still continuing) centuries of work to apply these tools to the 
survey of a planet. Development, change, and (dare I say) progress was 
manifested at a comparative snail’s pace. The eighteenth century militari-
zation of cartography hastened the separation of cartography from visual 
art, with the map ascending to a new status as a ground for contact among 
Enlightenment ideals, “the application of rational methods to practical 
ends” (Edney, 1994, p 18).  Capping it all, the nineteenth century roman-
ticizing of the figure of the artist in society and fiction, and the general 
course of development for art in the twentieth century, has done little to 
close the rift.
That romantiticization had its roots in the Renaissance and in the 
usurpation of the term ‘creation’ (hitherto reserved as an activity of 
deities) attributed to Michelangelo. In part it held that the act of artistic 
creation was of mystical or divine origin. In the nineteenth century this 
notion of artistic activity became very deeply entrenched in the cultural 
consciousness (even where it was ridiculed), but it was strongly chal-
lenged in the twentieth century by the Early Modernists. The Russian 
poet Mayakovsky (1970) spelled this challenge out quite plainly:
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Our chief and enduring hatred falls on sentimental-critical Philis-
tinism... This facile Black Mass is hateful to us because it casts around 
difficult and important poetical work an atmosphere of sexual trembles 
and palpitations, in which one believes that only eternal poetry is safe 
from the dialectical process, and the only method of production is the 
inspired throwing back of the head while one waits for the heavenly 
soul of poetry to descend on one’s bald patch in the form of a dove, a 
peacock or an ostrich. (p 11-12) 
Poetry is a manufacture. A very difficult, very complex kind, but a 
manufacture... The work of the verse-maker must be carried on daily, 
to perfect his craft, and to lay in poetical supplies... You mustn’t make 
the manufacturing, the so- called technical process, an end in itself. But 
it is this process of manufacture that makes the poetic work fit for use. 
(p 57)
One of the disappointments of Early Modernism was its ultimate 
failure to oust and eradicate the engrained sentimental attitudes to art 
practice, which continue to haunt us. In some respects it was this rejection 
by the Modernists of sentimentality and romance, illusions dearly held 
by the general populace, which contributed to the alienation of art prac-
tice from the common experience. This agitation instead had the ultimate 
effect of widening that gulf which disallows the ‘scientific’ cartographic 
practitioner from accepting the existence and legitimacy of his or her own 
art practice.
I. Definition
I would like to get out of this section without falling into the trap of 
actually having to define art. Art must ultimately be explained in terms 
of art, and not from a non-existent ‘outside’. I believe that the conceptual 
model I am putting forward, that of art as a means of expression rather 
like a language, obviates the requirement of that attempt. It is neither 
the dictionary, nor the grammar, the etymology, or any particular type 
or example of literature that defines any language; spoken, written or 
visual. Instead, I would point to the whole body of art, and to its con-
stituent or participant aspects paralleling the participants of language 
just mentioned.
 I am not writing a primer on art, and will not be dictating just how a 
conversance with aesthetics is to be obtained. In regard to a demand for a 
definition, I will again quote Pound (1960):
I refrain from indicating the chief device here employed […] The stu-
dent should find it for himself.
He can only find it by listening and looking. If he can’t find it for him-
self no amount of telling will make him understand it. There is a single 
clear principle employed. 
(p 152) 
John Krygier (1995) examined the art-science dichotomy and, despite 
its widespread currency in various flavors, found it wanting as a model 
for cartographic practice. Krygier proposed a process-oriented view of 
cartography to unify this seeming split, and such a view might indeed suf-
fice if the cleavage was only along that art-science line. A process, though, 
must have some guiding principle; there must be a rationale under which 
“One of the disappointments
of Early Modernism was its 
ultimate failure to oust and 
eradicate the engrained
sentimental attitudes to art 
practice . . .”
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the process can function. That principle is that the map is a persuasive 
argument, and the process (if one is to be identified) is the process of the 
construction of that argument. So, I would put forward, it is only through 
an understanding of the inherent and fundamental rhetorical nature of 
cartographic practice that the apparently disparate elements (be they art 
and science, or the rather more inclusive and less loaded terms that I have 
used: the cognitive, semiotic, and artistic) can be brought into an align-
ment.
V. CARTOGRAPHIC RHETORIC
I have thus far discussed cartography from each of the three registers I 
outlined at the start of this paper: the cognitive, the semiotic, and the ar-
tistic. Throughout the discussion, I have maintained the assertion that the 
three registers are essentially the same phenomenon examined from differ-
ent vantage points. A parallel might be drawn between the viewpoints es-
tablished by these registers and the viewpoints utilized in an orthographic 
drawing. Unifying these disparate vantages is the concept of the map as a 
rhetorical instrument. 
The most familiar definitions of rhetoric present it as “the art or the 
discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, 
to inform or persuade or move an audience” (Corbett, 1990, p 1).  That 
rhetoric is an ‘either spoken or written’ discourse, has been the commonly 
held, and generally rather pejorative, conception of rhetoric for many 
years. But Aristotle (1954) defined rhetoric as ‘the faculty of discovering 
all the available means of persuasion in a given situation’ (Corbett, 1990,
p 1), which is a very much broader and more useful conceptualization. 
Certainly, Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians saw themselves as 
working their persuasions with words, and not as we are here, with a 
graphic product; but it is neither improbable nor unprecedented to insist 
upon extending the term in this way. It can be seen to be not improbable
when one is reminded that the Greek word for persuasion derives from 
the Greek verb ‘to believe’, [and] one sees that Aristotle’s definition can 
be made to comprehend not only those modes of discourse which are 
‘argumentative’ but also those ‘expository’ modes of discourse which 
seek to win acceptance of information or explanation. (p 1)
 
Precedent for the usage can be found in the recent focus on the issue 
of rhetoric in the fields of product and graphic design, significantly so in 
the writings of Richard Buchanan (1989). His work on “communication as 
rhetoric, the inventive and persuasive relation of speakers and audiences 
as they are brought together in speeches or in other objects of communica-
tion” (p 91) is significant to the wider understanding of rhetoric to which I 
refer.
Although not so obvious at first glance, the themes of communication 
and rhetoric … exert strong influence on our understanding of all the 
objects made for human use. (Buchanan, 1989, p 91)
 
Central to this notion of ‘communication as rhetoric’ is a recognition 
that the aim of the endeavor is persuasion, to convince someone to believe 
something. As we saw in the discussion of extrasignificant codes and their 
function in construction of the mythical deployment of the map, there can 
be a great deal to be persuaded about with any particular map. How can 
this persuasion be achieved?
“That principle is that the map 
is a persuasive argument, and 
the process is the process of the 
construction of that argument.”
“. . . there can be a great deal 
to be persuaded about with any 
particular map. How can this 
persuasion be achieved?”
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A. The rhetorical appeals
The classical rhetoricians recognized that a speaker has three means of 
persuasion: the appeal to reason (logos); the appeal to emotions (pathos); 
and the appeal of the speaker’s character (ethos). Aristotle referred to 
these as the ‘artistic’ proofs to separate them from the five non-artistic 
proofs: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths. While the orator 
needs only discover the non-artistic proofs, s/he must invent the artis-
tic. Some of the non-artistic proofs, such as tortures, are not generally 
available to the cartographer, while other proofs, for example, witness in 
the form of surveyor’s data, are basic sources of mapping information. 
Many more examples of this type of documentation may be cited, and 
these make up important persuasive arguments for the map. The map, 
however, is derived from these sources (deeds, the surveyor’s notes, etc.), 
from these non-artistic proofs. The map is composed by employment of the 
artistic proofs.  Buchanan (1989) refers to these artistic proofs as ‘de-
sign control elements’, and I think that, for convenience, we can adopt 
Buchanan’s vocabulary.
1. Logos
The rational appeal, or logos, is essentially a logical argument. It is an 
appeal to the understanding. The reasoning can be deductive (work-
ing from general principles to particular conclusions), inductive (from 
particular statements to general conclusions), or a generalization, but it 
is important to note that in rhetoric the burden of proof is not anything 
near as onerous as in strict logic. Rhetoric aims to convince the audience 
of probable truth, as opposed to logic’s requirement to prove the conclu-
sion to be logical. The contrast is the same as in criminal and civil law, 
where (in theory anyway) only in the former must the case be proved be-
yond a shadow of doubt. In rhetoric, as in civil law, only the probability 
need be established. The vocabulary of classical rhetoric acknowledges 
this by employing terms differing from those used in logic. The par-
ticulars of the vocabulary, however, are not essential to this discussion, 
if the ideas can be broadly grasped. The utility of the distinction was 
explained by Eco (1976):
Almost all human reasoning about facts, decisions, opinions, beliefs 
and values is no longer considered to be based on the authority of 
Absolute Reason but instead intertwined with emotional elements, 
historical evaluations and pragmatic motivations. In this sense the new 
rhetoric considers the persuasive discourse not as a subtle fraudulent 
procedure but as a technique of ‘reasonable’ human interaction con-
trolled by doubt and explicitly subject to many extra-logical conditions. 
(p 277) 
 
In cartographic design terms, the logos governs the fitness for use, the 
usefulness of the map. In seeking to identify it we ask: what is the subject 
matter?, what is the theme of this map? The logos is the concept we would 
expect to be encapsulated in the title, and is the rationale for having a map 
at all. This logos is the aspect that a purely mechanical theory of commu-
nication would consider to be the totality. In its bald form the information 
might or could be as well presented as a table of numbers, a paragraph 
of text, or by some other means but there is a reason why it is presented 
in map form, a reason why a map is an appropriate form to be taken. It is 
important to not mistake the data itself for the logos; it is not the numbers 
“In cartographic design terms, 
the logos governs the fitness for 
use, the usefulness of the map.”
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as numbers but instead the reason for presenting the numbers as a map at 
all that is of significance here.
2. Pathos
While some might argue that in an ideal world (the thesis of Voltaire’s 
Doctor Pangloss notwithstanding) reason would guide all our thoughts 
and actions, it should be obvious that passions, prejudices, customs, and 
mythologies are more often than not the dominant influences. This is the 
place where pathos, the emotional appeal, operates. It works, that is, on 
the naturalized assumptions of the audience. These passions, prejudices, 
customs, and mythologies may be recognized for what they are (that is, 
as mythologies and whatnot) by the holders of the assumptions, but it 
is far more likely that they are not. Most probably the audience’s world 
view has been internalized to such an extent as to be indistinguishable to 
the opinion holders themselves from self evident fact. An understanding 
of psychology, history, and culture, and of the functioning of mythology, 
is imperative to the employment of such an appeal; ineptitude in that 
employment can backfire disastrously. Still, the pathos of the map is not 
restricted to the overall emotional appeal. We should view this element 
as the manner in which the map is made usable. Logos, as we saw, is the 
way the map is made fit for use, while pathos is the manner in which it is 
fit to use. This fitness is made by means of what is referred to as design 
affordances, the handles (so to speak) by means of which the user gets a 
hold on the map content and makes use of it. A bicycle with a gel seat is 
more fit for use than one where the rider perches on a steel bar: the former 
has a more effective ‘pathetic’ appeal to fitness. Ergonomics is one type of 
affordance, while a map legend could be cited as another, and as, indeed, 
could be the map graphic itself. The surveyor’s notes are transformed into 
a plan by application of the element of pathos, which allows us to see (as a 
laid out plan) the embodiment of the noted measurements. This particular 
example is at the most primary level, but the principle can be applied in 
all situations. Much of the research I have identified in the cognitive regis-
ter is directed to facilitating effective emotional appeals: the user chooses 
the map which seems most useable, that is, the map which seems most 
accessible to their use.
3. Ethos
The ethical appeal, that which is called the ethos, rests on the apparent or 
implied authority or character of the speaker or of the ‘object of commu-
nication’; especially as that character is presented in that ‘object of com-
munication’ itself. This appeal carries a great deal of weight, and indeed 
Aristotle thought that it could be the most powerful of the modes of per-
suasion. The designation of ‘Official’, or a governmental logo on a map, 
imparts an authority to the product that is hard to overestimate. It is very 
much easier to convince ones audience of almost anything if that audience 
can be first convinced of the high character of the speaker, and conversely 
very difficult (if not impossible) to make headway against the unfavorable 
prejudice of ones hearers. This appeal is of especial interest in connection 
to cartography, because of the special, and perhaps unique, position the 
map holds in the regard of much of the public. As has been noted before, 
the map is accepted as authoritative very much more readily by many 
persons than is speech or writing. Graphs have a similar power, but are 
more open to critical interpretation. Perhaps it is because the graph car-
ries much of its constructive structure explicitly, in the labeling of its axis’ 
“. . . while pathos is the manner 
in which it is fit to use.”
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for instance, while much of the map’s structure is less visible, and hence 
less well understood. Without doubt, the comparative, and often quite 
absolute, map illiteracy on the part of the community of map usage (i.e., 
the community of users) plays a significant role in the sometimes almost 
religious regard that public has for maps in general. To Gene Shepard’s 
typical ‘walking around type guy’ a map often seems a thing that must 
have leapt into the world fully formed, just like Pallas Athena sprang from 
the head of Zeus (assuming he knows that story…). The indignation with 
which a discovered or perceived ‘mistake’ on a map is met is indicative of 
that regard. 
However, as in our discussion of pathos, ethos is wider than these obvi-
ous aspects. The ‘voice’ with which the map speaks, the ethos of the map, 
shapes the desirability of the map. We have before us a map: it is useful 
(logos), and it is useable (pathos), but is it the right map?, the appropriate 
map?, is it the map we want to trust?, is it the map we want to use? This 
aspect of desirability is not one to be dismissed. Given a range of products 
with all aspects of usefulness and usability being equal, we will choose 
one: the desirable one. The desirable features we look for will vary with 
our needs and inclinations, but we will choose to use the map, object, or 
whatever in which we feel comfortable placing our faith. We place our 
faith in that which, apparently, deserves it. We chose different furniture 
for our offices, formal living rooms, and cottages because of the voice with 
which that furniture speaks; it is to the ethos of the design that we re-
spond. Similarly we select or (should) design our maps to speak with the 
voice we expect or require. It is from and through each map that the ethos 
will speak. A ‘Young People’s Guide’ to a city will have to speak in a very 
different voice from a ‘Scenic Parks and Walks Guide’. The voice of either 
will be quite distinct from both del Tredici’s Nuclear Map of Canada (2001) 
and from the officially sanctioned “Non-Ferrous Metals: Western Canada, 
1970” in The National Atlas of Canada (1974).  If the map speaks in an inap-
propriate voice, it will shout down even the best and finest work: simply 
stated, no one will believe in it. That voice shouting is the voice embodied 
by each individual map product as it is constituted in each instance to 
each user.
B. Some examples
While every map utilizes each of the ‘design control elements’, or means 
of persuasion, individual examples may be identified that seem to exert a 
dominant or particular appeal. Let us look for these elements by looking 
at examples of three quite different maps. The first is an example of the 
early, provisional edition of the Community Map series produced by the 
Halifax Regional Municipality, the ‘Bedford’ sheet (figure 11). The second 
is the (1998 proposed) Halifax Regional Municipality Visitor Map (figures 12 
and 13). The third map is Voyage Beyond Three Seas (figure 14), a map depict-
ing the travels of Afanasy Nikitin, a fifteenth century Russian traveler. I 
designed each of these three maps with quite distinct goals and audiences 
in mind: the first is a provisional worksheet, the second a basis for a fin-
ished mass distribution map, and the third as an illustrative appendix to a 
topical book. (see appendix for color version of maps)
1. Community map of Bedford, NS
The Bedford map is quite spare. It is a street map of the community (the 
former Town) of Bedford, Nova Scotia. The streets are depicted as single 
lines, without hierarchical differentiation, with the streets named using an 
“Given a range of products with 
all aspects of usefulness and 
usability being equal, we will 
choose one: the desirable one.”
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Figure 11. Community of Bedford, Halifax Regional Municipality, Nova Scotia – original:
55 inches x 33 inches. Bedford from the Community Map series 1998. (see page 79 for larger scale)
Figure 12. Halifax Regional Municipal-
ity Visitor Map: side 1. M. Denil – Halifax 
Regional Municipality 1998. (see page 80 for 
color plate)
Figure 13. Halifax Regional Municipal-
ity Visitor Map: side 2. M. Denil – Halifax 
Regional Municipality 1998. (See page 81 for 
color plate)
automatic computer name placement routine. The text is in all capitals and 
may in some instances be less than ideally positioned. A locational grid is 
overlaid on the map, allowing grid locations to be identified by means of 
an alpha-numeric Cartesian designation. Along the left side of the map is 
a rectangular block with the map title, scale bar, north arrow, a basic leg-
end, a legal disclaimer, and a street index. The street index identifies the 
geographic extents of the street in relation to the grid; not every grid area 
through which the street passes, but rather the furthest north, south, east, 
or west the street extends on this particular sheet. A short street entirely 
within a grid area will have only one designation, while a longer street 
may have up to four. If a street extends off the edge of the map into terri-
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Figure 14. Voyage Beyond the Seas. M. 
Denil. 1995. (see page 82 for color plate)
tory that may, perhaps, be depicted on a different map of the series, only 
the portion of the street appearing on this sheet is listed in the index. The 
grid areas are not, as is often the case with such systems, squares but are 
instead rectangles; it is, in fact, the Province’s geographically (latitude and 
longitude) based grid of 1:1000 map sheets for the area of the Municipality. 
Because the grid is a single one for the entire 5,000 odd square kilometers 
of the Regional Municipality, the relationship between the grid on this and 
any of the other maps in this series is constant. This Community Map series 
was a provisional one, and several design affordance elements were even-
tually incorporated in an improved version which is, I understand, still on 
sale in Municipal offices. 
2. Halifax Regional Municipality Visitor map
The Visitor map is a two-sided affair, printed in color, and designed to 
fold to a handy pocket size. The street network here is divided into a five 
level hierarchy, indicated graphically by differences in the color, width, 
and complexity of the line symbols. The urban and suburban areas are 
depicted at various scales, and there is a relatively small-scale map of the 
entire Municipality as well as a location map showing the Regional Mu-
nicipality’s geographic situation in Maritime Canada. The folding scheme 
is planned in such a way that, by refolding along the existing creases, 
each particular area map can be viewed conveniently. There are a number 
of locations identified on the map(s); hospitals, points of interest, parks, 
beaches (supervised and not), etc., and depiction of the areal extents of the 
built-up and business park zones.
3. Voyage Beyond Three Seas
Voyage Beyond Three Seas is another color map, rather smaller than the oth-
er two. It was designed as a fold out illustration for the published journal 
of Afanasy Nikitin (1985), but has never been included in any publication 
of that book. The projection is a perspective one, an inclined view of the 
globe from the distance of a single global diameter. Mountainous regions 
are depicted by means of ‘mole hill’ or ‘sugar lump’ symbols. Beside an 
explanatory synopsis, various anecdotes excerpted from the text of the 
story are included in their appropriate locations along the route, and each 
city mentioned is identified as well.
C. Evaluating the appeals
The dominant or particular appeal of each of these maps could be identi-
fied as: Bedford = logos, Visitor = ethos, and Voyage = pathos. The spare-
ness and directness of the Bedford street map situates its appeal close to 
the data, it identifies the overall tone of the map as a bald retelling of the 
information. The Visitor map’s appeal is an argument from authority; this 
is OUR territory as WE see it. WE have decided the true, official, street hi-
erarchy, at THESE beaches we will protect your safety, and so on. With the 
Voyage map the tug is on our emotions. One can see the vast distances this 
lonely traveler has wandered across the planet. Just look at the cities ris-
ing from the plains and the tracks winding through the mountains! What 
distances! What adversity! What determination!
What is it that allows us, or persuades us, to believe that these overall 
appeals are ‘true’ or ‘correct’? Examining the situation from another level, 
we could say that we are really describing a part of the ethical appeal of 
each map; the rhetorical element that determines the desirability of that 
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particular map for its use. The ethos of the Bedford map, the voice with 
which it speaks, is that it would have us believe that it is ‘close to the data’. 
The Visitor map would have us believe that being ‘official’ is the same as 
being ‘true’. And the Voyage map would have us believe that Nikitin’s was 
a journey of epic proportions. Each map is desirable for certain purposes, 
and each map speaks to us of its desirability.
These distinctions are important for understanding the functioning of 
the rhetorical appeals in cartography and by extension in other design 
work. Ethos is not authority, pathos is not soapy emotions, and logos is not 
a ‘technical’ or unadorned presentation (nor is logos the data); however, 
the ethos of each map may try to make us believe that it might be any of 
these. If that which we thought we had identified as the appeals are not, 
where then do we find the rhetorical elements? We have to go back to the 
ideas of logos, pathos, and ethos as governing, respectfully, usefulness, 
usability, and desirability. The ethical appeal of each of our examples has 
already been touched upon; what of the logical and emotional appeals?
The logos of each of the maps is located in the usefulness of that map; it 
is discovered by asking what the subject of the map might be. The sub-
ject of the Bedford Map is to be a guide to street location and/or to form 
a base map, or contextual ground, for other thematic data. That of the 
Visitor map is the ease of travel to all the varied and multitudinous places 
to visit and see in the Halifax Regional Municipality. The Voyage map’s 
subject, and hence its logos, is the itinerary of our observant, wandering 
merchant.
Pathos governs the usability of each map: it determines what elements 
are present and how they are presented (given the voice of the ethos). It 
is through the emotional appeal, through design affordances, that on the 
Bedford map the streets are depicted graphically. It is through affordances 
that they are named on the map face, that they are named in a list, and 
that there is a cross-reference in the form of a location grid. Each of these 
elements provides an access to the streets in Bedford, each alone and in 
conjunction with the others. 
Let us imagine that we have a street name in mind, a street that may 
be in Bedford. The list tells us that a street with that name is on the map, 
a useful bit of information. The Cartesian coordinate reference listed 
with that name allows us to use the grid affordance to locate the street. 
Only once we get to this stage can the graphic representation allow us to 
determine the place of this street in the topology (connectedness) of the 
network, to discover how we get there. This is only one path (path that is, 
of discovery, not of travel down the street) and destination (where is this 
street?) afforded us through the information; many other query paths and 
destinations are conceivable. Without one or another of the design affor-
dances utilized here, however, the range of possible paths to finding out 
what we wanted to know, or even what we could find out, would be more 
tightly circumscribed. As well, affordances could be added to enhance and 
expand the access; if the streets were classified hierarchically, we could 
better determine the best or most efficient route through the network, or 
could speed our visual search in other ways. A key, or location map would 
let us identify the area on this map in relation to a larger zone, and/or to 
other maps in the community series.
Other affordances on the Bedford map determine, for instance, the 
existence and layout of the title block. So too is the way the map informa-
tion stops one tenth of an inch from the neat line, creating a visual as well 
as a conceptual separation of what we might call map space from paper 
space. The other example maps, being of greater complexity than this one, 
naturally exhibit greater complexities in the affordances, in these appeals 
“Each map is desirable for 
certain purposes, and each map 
speaks to us of its desirability.”
“Pathos governs the usability 
of each map: it determines what 
elements are present and how 
they are presented (given the 
voice of the ethos).”
“The logos of each of the maps is 
located in the usefulness of that 
map; it is discovered by
asking what the subject of the 
map might be.”
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to usefulness. One could cite the symbols employed, the supporting texts, 
the colors, the layouts, among other things. In other words, all the parts 
that make the map useable could be listed: the pathos uses the voice of the 
ethos to present the logos. 
Naturally each appeal is interdependent on the others. If the emo-
tionally determined affordances are not appropriate to the subject, then 
the voice with which the map speaks will not be the one expected. It is 
this very interdependence that makes a conversance with the rhetorical 
appeals imperative. The interrelationship between the logos, ethos and 
pathos is not fixed either, but relative. That is to say that no element of the 
three is ever ‘left behind’ in any decision or detail of the design process; 
at no point can one or another of the elements be disregarded. Together, 
these three appeals or design control elements make up the voice with 
which the map speaks. The ethos works with the pathos to serve the logos, 
just as the logos and ethos direct the pathos, while the pathos and logos 
underpin the ethos. Each control element meets and operates in each deci-
sion, and at each stage of the composition of each map from the earliest 
stages onward. 
D. Summary thoughts on Cartographic Rhetoric
In order to gain and maintain a working control of the rhetoric of the map, 
the various registers of understanding I introduced in this paper must be 
marshaled. It is under the rubric of rhetoric that these registers—the cogni-
tive, the semiotic, and the artistic—can be seen as simply distinct views or 
aspects of cartography. It is not cartography that changes, but the vantage 
or point of view. The quest of rhetoric is to employ all available means to 
persuade. Without a command of these registers of understanding, em-
ployed through the rhetorical appeals of logos, ethos, and pathos, all avail-
able means of persuasion are not in the cartographer’s hands. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have seen how each of the more traditional approaches to cartogra-
phy, which I have identified as the cognitive, semiotic, and artistic regis-
ters, can be recognized as integral supports of the rhetorical cartographic 
model. Each is, by itself or paired with one other, inadequate to describe 
the nature of cartography or to serve as a guide to practice or understand-
ing. Only the threefold conjunction of the registers, united under the 
rubric of cartography’s rhetorical nature, can provide the guide to prac-
tice that was sought at the beginning of this paper. The boundaries of the 
registers themselves are not critical, because other configurations of these 
approaches are conceivable, but the registers as I have framed them are 
a convenient categorization and happen not to leave any loose ends or 
awkward corners poking out. 
Obviously, there can be no transfer of information, there is nothing that 
can be ‘gotten across’, which is not configured in a communicable form. 
The forms of communication are rhetorical; that is to say, ideas can only be 
conveyed with reference to an audience, and that reference must neces-
sarily be subjectively infiltrated. A map is, in fact, a persuasive argument 
placed before an audience and like any proposition or argument, must be 
addressed to that audience. 
A map is made for a map user who could be anyone (and may in fact 
be the map maker her or him self), but that user will in every case have 
certain needs that the map must address. The needs are for a useful map 
(a map they need), a usable map (a map they can use), and a desirable 
“It is under the rubric of
rhetoric that these registers—
the cognitive, the semiotic, and 
the artistic—can be seen as 
simply distinct views or aspects 
of cartography.”
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map (a map they want to use; that they desire). These needs are brought to 
the map by each user, and a map will have to meet each need, or it simply 
will not be employed. 
These human needs are addressed, as we have seen, by the design con-
trol elements which we have labeled logos, pathos, and ethos; terms taken 
from classical rhetoric. Logos, the reason for making a map, addresses the 
use of the map. Pathos is concerned with the ways the map is rendered us-
able to the audience. It is the part of the ethos to induce the potential user 
to choose a particular map; to convince the user to desire it, to believe it 
and to be guided by it. 
The interrelation and interdependence of these rhetorical elements is 
often not properly understood by practitioners and theorists. In many 
situations the notion held would seem to be that somehow simply ‘laying 
bare’ the data will ‘get across’ the information without the taint of extra-
neous ‘frills’. One upshot of this thinking is attempts to posit some kind 
of dichotomy of visualization and presentation, so-called ‘GIS Visualiza-
tion’, as some have attempted recently. These attempts are predicated on 
an inherent fallacy; to wit, that somehow ‘presentation’ has been rendered 
extraneous by the advent of electronic data storage and manipulation. The 
fact is, one cannot talk even to oneself without some kind of code, that is 
to say without some kind of rhetorical framework which has some sort of 
valid meaning to the one addressed. Talking to oneself is not fundamen-
tally different from talking to anyone else. It is less than obvious why the 
whole ‘visualization’ hooha has arisen.
In practice the question arises of how one is to identify and address the 
rhetorical design control elements of use, usability and desirability, or lo-
gos, pathos, and ethos. Hanno Ehses of the Nova Scotia College of Art and 
Design has proposed that this identification can be made in any graphic 
or other product by posing five basic questions. Adapted to a cartographic 
context, these questions are:
 1. What is the subject of the map?
  What is the logos? To what use should this map be fit?
 2. What is the voice with which we want the map to speak?
 What is the ethos? Who are we, and whom are we addressing?
 3. How will we make this map useful? 
  What is the pathos? What questions are likely to be put to this map, and 
how will this map be able to answer?
 4. What is the argument forwarded by the map?
  What should this map be stating clearly? What does it attempt to say 
about the subject (the logos)? Note that we are not asking here what the 
logos is, but rather what the map is saying about it.
 5. What is the purpose of the map?
  Why do we want a map, anyway? Why not something else?
 
The mapmaker (or user) can use these questions to construct (or decon-
struct) the conceptual framework of the map. Ambiguities or contradic-
tory aspects of the project or product can be identified and either corrected 
by the mapmaker or compensated for by the user. The questions should be 
addressed at the outset of a project, and reviewed at intervals throughout 
its progress. It must be clear to the map maker and to the client at every 
step just what is to be spoken about, who s/he is that is speaking, and how the 
user will be able to take advantage of what is given. 
Each aspect must buttress and in turn be supported by the others: the 
appropriateness of each decision to the constructed argument is the arbi-
ter. The voice of the map and the direct, immediate purpose for the pro-
“Hanno Ehses of the Nova
Scotia College of Art and 
Design has proposed that this 
identification can be made in 
any graphic or other product by 
posing five basic questions.”
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duction of the map will figure largely in the selection and implementation 
of the design affordances. In other words; it is the voice of the map as a 
‘speaker’, a speaker with a clear topic and agenda, which will dictate what 
‘words’ are actually employed, and in what manner they are utilized, to 
construct the map’s argument. 
Since all the map can ever present to the user is an argument, it is the 
role of the cartographer, as rhetorician, to assure that the map presents the 
best and most convincing argument available.
Final Thoughts
I have attempted to analyze the nature of the cartographic activity itself, 
and to propose a manner of understanding that nature which is general, 
inclusive, and practically applicable. These concerns might be dismissed 
by some as an obsession, or of interest only to someone under the spell 
of a passion, and inexplicable to others who are not so charmed, but that 
would be a mistake. These issues are fundamental, and rightly stir pro-
found passions.  Pound (1960) put it succinctly:
It is very difficult to make people understand the impersonal indigna-
tion that a decay of writing can cause men who understand what it 
implies, and the end whereto it leads. It is almost impossible to express 
any degree of such indignation without being called ‘embittered’ or 
something of that sort. (p 34) 
 
Cartography is facing new challenges in these days of desktop applica-
tion egalitarianism, ‘quick and dirty’ output, and a general discounting 
of ‘mere cartographic concerns’. The questions surrounding the so-called 
new challenges to cartography can, under the rhetorical model be seen for 
what they are: questions relating to specificities of implementation. The 
challenge is to master the new tools, and to bring them to bear on the pro-
duction of what is, underneath a sometimes gaudy skin, the same kind of 
cartographic arguments we have, as cartographers, been producing (with 
generally fair success) for quite some time. This is not to say that we can 
just trundle along in a naively secure fashion, cherishing the same quaint 
and curious notions about our service to ‘science’ and to ‘truth’.  No, we 
have got to come to grips with the nature of our activities and our concep-
tion of the nature of these activities has got to focus on what cartography 
is, rather than what maps have been thought up till now to be. Cartogra-
phy is and has always been a rhetorical activity because the only reason 
for making any map is the presentation or preservation of some opinion, 
of some argument, of some value judgment. If we can recognize the 
centrality of rhetoric to cartography, and by corollary abandon the halluci-
nation that cartography has any specific subject matter, then the future of 
cartography looks as bright, and promises to be at least as long, as its past.
“If we can recognize the
centrality of rhetoric to
cartography, and by corollary 
abandon the hallucination that 
cartography has any specific 
subject matter, then the future 
of cartography looks as bright, 
and promises to be at least as 
long, as its past.”
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CODA
 There is nothing either good or bad,
 but thinking makes it so.
   Hamlet [II ii 265-6]
The questions of what makes a good map, and how a good map is to be 
made, have been of concern to mapmakers for quite some time. Certainly, 
there is a tremendous body of literature about cartography, from Strabo 
(and perhaps earlier) to the present, examining the practice and products 
from all manner of angles and vantages, but it is conspicuous that no 
complete and consistently applicable theoretical description of cartogra-
phy has ever been set out. It is not as if no one has ever found or made a 
good map; obviously good maps (or maps deemed good) have abounded, 
alongside others deemed perhaps not so very good, and still others barely 
identifiable as maps. How is one to judge? How is one to proceed?  Is it 
just what one likes? If so, what does it mean to be likable, and how is the 
map rendered likable?
Some of the myriad writers on cartography have tackled these ques-
tions of what it is that makes a good map and have, from time to time, 
come up with answers of sorts. The usual process is to examine some 
maps and draw some conclusions; arguing from the particular to the 
general. The problem with this approach is the tremendous variety of 
things that can, have, could, and will be, and often or sometimes are 
made, seen and / or used as maps. In the absence of a theoretical ground-
ing, examining any broadly representative sampling will highlight the 
variety of differences as much or more than the fundamental similarities. 
Non fundamental, anecdotal specificities of variety may lend itself to the 
construction of typologies, but any taxonomy of maps ends up resembling 
the categorization of animals:
which doctor Franz Kuhn attributes to a certain Chinese encyclopaedia 
entitled Celestial Empire of benevolent Knowledge. In its remote pages it is 
written that the animals are divided into: 
(a) belonging to the emperor, 
(b) embalmed, 
(c) tame, 
(d) sucking pigs, 
(e) sirens, 
(f) fabulous, 
(g) stray dogs,
(h) included in the present classification, 
(i) frenzied, 
(j) innumerable, 
(k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, 
(l) et cetera, 
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, 
(n) that from a long way off look like flies.   
(Borges 1999)
Neither this nor any other taxonomy would help us define animals in gen-
eral. Similarly, it is not obvious how a theory of cartography would begin 
with a taxonomy of maps.
Another approach has been to focus on ‘fundamentals’ of cartography. 
Cartographic Fundamentalists have centralized the elemental manuals 
of mechanical procedure as the key to understanding mapping practice. 
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Certainly, there are a number of such manuals, and no one would seri-
ously contend that competence in sound technical practice is without an 
important place in cartography. Centralizing technical practice, however, 
would imply that if everything is ‘done right’ the result would be a perfect 
map. Is a technically ‘correct’ map always a good map? Could it be that 
something beyond the textbook fundamentals is required?
What is it that is common to all things we might call a map? Is it not 
the need or desire to put forward some view? To present to some audi-
ence an argument about a situation (be it perhaps the lay of the land, the 
usual number of frost free days, or the nesting range of the Piping Plo-
ver)? It seems obvious that this is so. Not only does a map always, and 
necessarily, put forward a position, but it uses three main means of fram-
ing that argument to its audience. There must be a reason for forwarding 
the position, the position must be understood by the audience, and the 
position must be seen to be believable by that audience. No matter what 
the subject, no matter what the medium, no matter what the use, no 
matter what the audience: that an argument is forwarded in reference to 
an audience is common to all maps, each and every one. This argument 
in reference to an audience is the central defining nature of cartographic 
practice. If the map fails in this endeavor, it fails as a map; if it prospers 
in this, it succeeds. 
The activity of forwarding an argument in reference to an audience is 
the definition of Rhetoric. Defining cartography as rhetorical conceptual-
izes the practice as one without specific subject matter and allows us to 
examine cartography itself as opposed to examining individual maps or 
processes of manifestation. It makes accessible as well the language and 
concepts of classical rhetoric to frame our investigation. 
The three main means of framing the cartographic argument, as men-
tioned above, constitute the appeals of usefulness (the reason for a map), 
usability (a map that is understood), and desirability ( a map that is be-
lieved). Other appeals the map makes are determined by the information 
presented or employed; this data is brought to the map and presented in 
a manner framed and controlled by the main appeals. The data is critical 
but it is not what runs the show on the map; that is province of the main 
appeals. All well and good, one might say, but how is this put into effect?
Classical rhetoric was based on speech and writing, and it developed an 
elaborate and detailed structure to describe and understand how spoken 
and written argument was constructed, presented and understood. The 
tropes and figures, along with the analysis of parts of an oration, exam-
ined and made available to the rhetor means and tools for constructing 
and presenting his arguments. Cartography has a large body of literature 
examining and describing the various aspects which play a part in the 
manifestation of a particular map. There is as well a large body of writing 
which is applicable to cartographic practice, but which may or may not be 
commonly tapped by cartographers. In the course of this investigation I 
organize these aspects attendant to cartography into registers of concern. 
It should be noted that these are not exclusive categories of maps, styles, 
materials, or methods, but are instead characterizations of analytic con-
cerns making up what can be identified as viewpoints, any one of which 
is a valid and useful position from which to interrogate a map. In fact, 
not only is each valid and useful individually, but all, collectively united 
under the rubric of rhetoric, are necessary for a full understanding. 
To recap: rhetorical argument is what the map does, forwarding ap-
peals of usefulness, usability, and believability, grounded in data, through 
various mechanisms (organized here into registers). In the vocabulary of 
classical rhetoric, the map is composed by the invented appeals (useful-
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ness, usability, and desirability), and derived from the discovered appeals 
(data), through the available means (the registers).  Comparing a map to 
a wall, one could say that data are the bricks, the registers are the mortar,  
and the invented rhetorical appeals are the design and rational for the 
construction.
Rhetoric, as we can see, gives us a means of answering the questions 
about how a good map can be made, as posed above. It does so while, 
admittedly, leaving the term good somewhat unexamined. Obviously, the 
term is used here in a very narrow sense; a good map being defined as a 
map which functions well as a map in a context or situation. It could be 
argued that this approach to cartography is amoral; that it completely 
ignores the imperatives of ethical behavior and fails to examine the pro-
cesses that give rise to the norms and conventions that have immediate 
day-to-day impacts on cartographic practice. It could even, I suppose, be 
argued that this could be an unprincipled guide for the cartographer as 
mercenary. I would not deny that it could; in fact it would be required to 
be so usable. Any complete theory of cartography would have to allow for 
and include all observed phenomena. Have we never seen ‘misleading’ 
maps? Have there never been maps that distort a situation in some man-
ner to make some questionable point or mislead some person or persons 
to a particular conclusion? I think we can all recall examples. Do, however, 
these maps, in working this persuasion, use some means substantively dif-
ferent from that of any other map? I think not.
Ethical consideration should always direct the cartographer; ethical 
imperatives are, however, culturally determined (for instance in a soci-
ety or within a business concern). Any particular culture will have quite 
specific drivers and responses to situational and political pressures that, 
while analogous and useful in comparison to another culture’s response, 
would not be universal or common. I am not an ethicist; any discussion 
of situations or imperatives I could forward would be framed only by my 
own ethics and karma. My own ethics are, of course, beyond reproach, 
but an exposition of my ethics would be of little general value because it 
would simply constitute a specificity, out of place when we are looking 
for commonalities. The great Greek rhetorician Isocrates didn’t claim to 
inculcate virtue either; he said, “let no one suppose that I claim that just 
living can be taught; for I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind 
which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures.” (Isocrates 
1928) The intention here is to present an understanding of cartography 
and cartographic practice that can serve as a stage upon which ethical 
considerations can stand exposed and play out their parts. 
That said, it will be noted that in this paper I do discuss what I identify 
as the ethos, or ethical appeal of the map; it is this appeal which governs 
the map’s believability. While I focus on the ethos the map presents, and 
which in many cases it only pretends to hold, I acknowledge that there 
must really be an ethical grounding present; however shoddy or fine it 
really is when the daylight shines upon it. Again, I only point to the place; 
you have to fill it yourself.
Very seldom is a cartographer in a position to be in control of his or 
her map’s ethical stance. If the cartographer has naturalized and internal-
ized the assumptions, prejudices and mythologies of his or her clients 
(patrons), then the cartographer is unlikely to ever detect any ethical 
dilemma. If, on the other hand, the cartographer finds him or herself 
questioning or in conflict with these framing assumptions, and fails to per-
suade others to go along with their views (assuming there is even a forum 
for or possibility of such a persuasion), there remains only the options of 
submission or resignation (the boss’ way or the highway). Continued sur-
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render lends itself to internalization of the dominate belief structure, as the 
cartographer learns to (at least) ignore the controversy.  
I began to formulate this theory of cartographic design in the late 
1990’s, although the roots of the concerns and the inklings of the answers 
stretch back to my earliest studies of cartography. I was privileged in my 
graduate studies to work with Hanno Ehses of the Nova Scotia College 
of Art and Design. Ehses’ work on rhetoric in graphic design, as outlined 
in publications such as Design and Rhetoric: An Analysis of Theatre Posters 
(Ehses 1986), and Rhetorical Handbook (Ehses and Lupton 1996), gave direc-
tion and structure to the ideas about cartography that I had been trying to 
organize for some time. 
I have also been privileged to have so very often been in a position to 
explore and refine my theoretic investigations in my professional practice. 
Currently I am responsible for capacity building among, and the develop-
ment of standards and conventions for, a large and diverse body of map-
makers situated in offices around the world. These map makers may not 
always be full time cartographers, or even full time GIS technicians, and 
are making maps to address local, regional, and world wide audiences 
with widely differing concerns and expectations. The prospect of sup-
porting (in a collaborative, non-authoritarian manner) such an enterprise 
is, I believe, furthered and made possible by the theoretical grounding I 
present here. Conversely, the situation also forms the crucible in which the 
theory is refined in the heat of real map use and production.
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